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Introduction
Ambassador Roger G. Harrison
Editor-in-Chief

All of the articles submitted for this edition of
our journal deal, in one way or another, with
an essential change in the relative position of
the United States in space, or – to put the
matter rather more bluntly – the decline of
U.S. space power and what to do about it. I
should add quickly that the decline is relative,
and the base against which it’s measured is
arbitrary. What is treated as a base was in fact
a high point. It came in the 1990s, when the
former Soviet space program was in disarray,
the Europeans had not yet found their
competitive edge and the prospect of China as
a power space player was, at best, on the
horizon, no bigger than a man’s hand. The
U.S. was, for that decade, the unchallenged
“shepherd of space” to use Everett Dolman’s
evocative imagery. It was possible to imagine
the world accepting the United States as a
benevolent hegemon, setting rules to benefit
all while remaining (as hegemonic powers
generally do) somewhere outside the rules
ourselves. At least this vision of “space
control” was possible for U.S. observers to
conjure. The rest of the world was simply
annoyed.
It isn’t necessarily “declinism” to point out
that the vision has faded. In space, as in golf,
it isn’t possible to win by preventing the other
guy from doing better, and the circumstances
that led to U.S. domination in the 1990’s
began to change as the century turned. By
then, the Russian Federation had regained its
balanced, and reminded us that it was a near
peer competitor with technology in some areas
– notably rocket motors – that was still the
best in the world. The European Arianne
launcher had proven both reliable and

scalable, and by 2000, Europe was a
legitimate competitor, too. Commercial
companies increased their share of space
activity, and became supra-national, moving
offshore to places like the Bahamas and
Luxemburg. And here came China with both
commercial programs and offensive ASAT
programs that brought into serious question
the central proposition of “space control”
ideology, i.e. that the U.S. could control
“access to space” and therefore space itself.
That seems to have become a hollow – albeit
in some circles still hallowed – claim.
The Obama space policy and strategy are
meant to deal with this new reality, and with
the sobering prospect of budget shortfalls as
far as the eye can see. Operating in space
sucks resources at a frightening rate, a bad
quality to have when the overall pie is
shrinking. All of our authors seem to accept
this new reality. They focus on its
implications, which might be summed up in
two thoughts: in the future, the United States
will need to collaborate with other nations in
space, and get more out of every dollar spent.
The era of autarky is over.
What should we do now? That is the subject
all our authors address, and I shall leave them
to speak for themselves. But there is one
omission – not just from these articles, but
from the national dialogue on security space in
general – that I must point out. In all the
discussion of vaguely defined rules of the
road, and norms, voluntary codes of conduct
and “transparency and confidence building
measures” there is a tendency to forget that
space is subject to binding international law in
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the form of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
That treaty speaks to issues that are no longer
relevant: no one planned even in 1967 to
station nuclear missiles on the moon. But also
has pertinent things to say about consultation,
and interference with the satellite operations
of other states. It was meant to begin a process
which – had it been taken seriously – might
have allowed the evolution over time of a
legal structure for space to deal with the
problems of crowding and debris that we face
now. It might even have been a framework for
the discussion of curbing an arms race in
space. None of this potential was realized,
largely because both the Soviet Union and the
United States preferred freedom of action to
any legally binding regime in space. The
Treaty was signed, ratified, and then largely
ignored.
I pointed this out recently to a room full of
government space analysts, listing the sorts of
things the OST addresses, sometimes in
specific terms. Someone commented: “We
could never get that sort of thing now.”
Perhaps not. Luckily, we already have that
sort of thing. It may be time to burrow in the
archives, dust off the OST and ask ourselves
whether its relevant to the concerns we now
have in space – and if not, how it can be
improved.
RGH

Coalitions in Space:
Where Networks are Power
James Clay Moltz
Naval Postgraduate School

	
  
Abstract: This study begins with the widely
recognized problem of 21st century space
vulnerabilities. To address this challenge, it
proposes the new concept of an “allied space
network” as a possible means of both
reducing risks and enhancing space power.
Such a concept would move beyond realist,
Cold War “balancing” in space, and instead
would require new forms of technical and
political cooperation in the military sector
among participating states. In thinking about
future space security this study argues that
trans-national networks and alliances offer
considerable untapped potential, with possibly
significant benefits particularly for the United
States, which—unlike China and Russia—
already has established military alliances with
a number of countries possessing or now
developing advanced space capabilities.
The challenge of achieving security in space
has traditionally been viewed as purely a
national security matter. Until 1991, space
activity was dominated by the hostile U.S.Soviet rivalry, which prevented active security
cooperation in space beyond a series of
restraint-based agreements. Other space
actors remained too weak to matter. In terms
of space operations, the two superpowers kept
apart from one another except for occasional,
publicity-serving civilian missions like the
1975 Apollo-Soyuz flight. What passed for
cooperative space security arrangements
during the Cold War emerged from a
somewhat uncomfortable mutual tolerance of
highly independent (and classified) U.S. and
Soviet reconnaissance satellites and a series of

largely bilateral (and a few multilateral)
treaties that banned certain extremely harmful
activities. Fortunately, thanks to these limited
mechanisms and policies of self-restraint, the
Cold War in space ended without any direct
attacks on either side’s satellites or other
spacecraft.
Yet, since the end of the Cold War, there has
been very little further progress made toward
strengthening international space security
mechanisms, while there has been a spread of
space technology and an expansion in the
number of actors capable of doing harm in
space. China broke an informal 22-year
moratorium against kinetic-kill anti-satellite
tests in January 2007 by destroying its own
Fen-Yung 1C weather satellite at 525 miles
up, creating more than 3,000 pieces of
hazardous debris. In response, India has
vowed to develop an anti-satellite capability.
In the face of the 2002 U.S. decision to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty and the Navy’s February 2008
destruction of an ailing satellite with a full
tank of hydrazine (U.S. 193)—although at low
altitude and with no long-lasting debris—
Russia stated that it would respond to any
future U.S. action to weaponize space with its
own program. Among new actors, Iran
successfully orbited a satellite in 2009, and
North Korea has made two attempts to do so,
raising concerns about these actors’ intentions
in space. Recent events have also stimulated
interest in space among other national
militaries, some of whom now speak of new
“threats” to their space assets. In this context,
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action-reaction space arming is a widely
feared trajectory. These dynamics pose a
serious risk, particularly because there are a
number of significant loopholes in the loose
network of existing Cold War space security
treaties and conventions, which currently
allow a variety of space weapons to be tested
and deployed in compliance with international
law. Moreover, the space environment lacks
adequate verification mechanisms—such as
pre-launch inspections, on-orbit spacecraft
monitoring, and comprehensive space
situational awareness—and is characterized by
an increasing number of actors.
In the face of this worrisome trend, one
influential school of thought among U.S.
space analysts sees strengthened national
military measures—including ground-to-space
weapons, air-to-space systems, and spacebased weapons—as the most desirable path
for addressing this emerging space security
dilemma. Such perspectives prevailed among
the senior ranks of Defense and State
Department officials during the George W.
Bush Administration and remain popular
among conservative analysts. This
perspective warns of the risk of what the 2001
Rumsfeld Commission report called a “space
Pearl Harbor,” unless the United States
deploys a range of defensive and offensive
space weapons,1 even though many of these
analysts recognize that such deployments
might stimulate the same behavior among
foreign space programs. But they see few
alternatives.
A second school of thought argues that
strengthened norms, rules, and international
treaties are the best means of achieving space

security and preventing a looming space arms
race. This school is found mostly among nongovernmental organizations, the arms control
community, and some members of the Obama
Administration, who have argued that the risks
to space security are inherently international
and that the main problem lies in the lack of
clear “rules” for space. They point out that the
use of space for weapons purposes will
impinge on other actors as well, particularly if
the attacking country creates orbital space
debris that then becomes a risk to other space
assets. For this reason, the Obama
Administration made significant changes in
the U.S. National Space Policy released in
June 2010,2 which now—in contrast to the
Bush Administration’s policy—supports U.S.
consideration of new, verifiable international
agreements to improve space security.
Almost two years into the Obama
Administration, however, progress on the
international front has been elusive. Despite
more accommodative policies undertaken
since 2009 by both the United States and
China at the U.N. Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, there have been no
formal international talks on space security,
thanks to Pakistan’s opposition to forming an
agenda that includes
“Space is in
a Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty. This serious need
of stronger
has prolonged a gap
in such discussions
international
that has lasted since
regimes.”
the early 1990s. In
this context, treaty loopholes have festered
since the end of the Cold War, while space
technology has become more sophisticated
and more dispersed during the same years.
As a bipartisan U.S. study on security in the

1

U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization,” January 11, 2001, available
online from the Air University’s National Space Studies
Center website, at: http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/
(accessed August 27, 2010).

2

The White House, “National Space Policy of the United
States of America,” June 28, 2010, available on the White
House Office Science and Technology Policy website, at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_
policy_6-28-10.pdf (accessed August 27, 2010).
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“global commons” issued in January 2010
concludes, “Space is in serious need of
stronger international regimes.”3
Unfortunately, such agreements do not
currently appear to be on the horizon, except
for a voluntary European-sponsored Code of
Conduct proposal. These trends foster
uncertainty in regards to space and a tendency
among national militaries to look to
traditional, weapons-based solutions, whose
testing, debris generation, and hair-trigger
alert systems may put spacecraft at greater
risk than even during the Cold War. For these
reasons, alternative approaches to reducing
space vulnerability are needed—and soon.
Notably, one option that has not been
examined seriously enough in the current
space debate is a possible middle-ground
alternative for reducing spacecraft
vulnerability: that of creating an allied space
“network.” Specifically, linking space
capabilities first among formal U.S. military
allies and then
perhaps with
“Linking space
other friendly
capabilities first
nations could
among formal
greatly reduce
U.S. military
(if not
allies … could
eliminate) the
greatly reduce
risks of singlepoint failures
the risks of
to important
single point
space systems
failures…
and create a
new form of space deterrence by raising the
stakes for adversaries considering launching
attacks on space assets. That is, by spreading
capabilities among allies in space through the
creation of interoperable, redundant networks
of satellites, including in the military sector,
3

Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds.,
“Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a
Multipolar World,” Center for a New American Security,
Washington, D.C., January 2010, p. 33.

7

space-based partnerships could reduce costs,
lessen vulnerability, and raise the challenges
facing would-be attackers, thus obviating the
need for expensive and destabilizing spacebased weapons. This could provide
considerable benefits in terms of U.S. and
allied space security and improve chances for
developing norms of peaceful international
behavior.
Yet despite these possible advantages of
“allied” space thinking, no conceptual
framework had been developed to date, and
policy support has only very recently emerged
in the 2010 National Space Policy and the
2011 National Security Space Strategy.
Operational cooperation is still very
rudimentary, where it exists at all. Indeed, as
the former head of U.S. space operations in
Afghanistan complained regarding the lack of
integration of allied orbital assets, “U.S. space
operators are not trained in how to be
integrated into a coalition environment.”4 The
reason stems from more than five decades of
viewing space almost exclusively from a
national security perspective, rather than an
international security or coalition framework.
This article argues, however, that changing
conditions in space are making the traditional
approach out-dated and increasingly
ineffective. Instead, an allied approach to
space may represent the best short-term route
to enhanced U.S. and allied space security,
while potentially offering benefits to the
global community of space users as well
through its promotion of restraint-based
norms.
In order to address these issues, this article
first analyzes the nature of space
vulnerabilities and offers a
4

USAF Lt. Col. Tom Single, quoted in Peter B. de Selding,
“U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition Forces Hinders Use
of Space Assets in Afghanistan,” Space News, May 10, 2010,
p. A1.

8

James Clay Moltz/Coalitions in Space, Where Networks are Power

reconceptualization of the current security
dilemma facing nations in space. It next
considers the specific emerging threats to 21st
century space security and discusses a
possible framework for moving from national
to multilateral means of combating them. In
doing so, it notes certain obstacles to be
overcome as well. Finally, the article sketches
out in draft form what specific capabilities
might be desirable and what foreign
contributions the United States might enlist in
creating an allied space network to increase
the mutual security of its members.

There are real and credible threats to
Space systems. The ground systems
are vulnerable to attack. There has
been demonstrated use of GPS and
SATCOM jammers. Anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons have been
demonstrated by the Soviet
Union…and in January of 2007,
China demonstrated its capability
[…]. The potential exists for groundbased laser weapons, electromagnetic pulse, and co-orbital ASAT
weapons. Additionally, there are risks
of collision from Space debris and
impacts from solar events. There have
been many instances of satellite
telecommunications interference and
piracy.6

Reconceptualizing Space Security
The issue of spacecraft vulnerability relates to
certain basic facts of orbital physics combined
with the relative transparency of space to
radar, optical, and infrared observation.5
These conditions make spacecraft liable to
tracking even by amateur astronomers with
only moderately sophisticated equipment,
which is easily obtainable by any entry-level
space power. While more complex guidance
technology is required for actual attacks on
space assets and a global network of radars is
needed for conducting post-attack assessments
of damage done, the ability of even
moderately advanced space powers to conduct
significant counterspace activities is not in
question. Thus far, only Russia, the United
States, and China have tested kinetic
capabilities, but a number of other countries
(including Iran) have carried out lesser forms
of electronic interference. As a major space
assessment conducted by NATO’s Joint Air
Power Competence Centre in 2009 reported
on some of the current vulnerabilities faced by
the alliance in space:
5

On these issues, see David Wright, Laura Grego, and
Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A
Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 2005).

Space assets are also threatened by a field of
orbital space debris that is steadily growing
due to the increase in human space activity
and the inability of space to “clean” itself
quickly. Depending on the altitude of the
orbit, it can take years, decades, or centuries
for pieces of space debris to deorbit. In the
meantime, these particles (even as small as 1
centimeter) represent 18,000 miles-per-hour
speeding bullets, which can destroy solar cells
and cause often fatal damage to any spacecraft
that are unfortunate enough to cross their
paths.7 Today’s space environment is also
characterized by an expansion in the number
of civil, commercial, and military space
actors, making international agreements more
difficult than in the past.
In the face of these risks and evidence of both
expanding military space programs and
weapons test programs in several countries,
the response by many U.S. military leaders,
elected officials, and even experts is still a
traditional call for exclusively national action
to “defend” U.S. assets in space. To take just
6

Ibid., p. 8.
National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical
Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1995), p. 12.
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one U.S. example, Senator Jon Kyl (Rep.,
Arizona) stated after the 2007 Chinese ASAT
test that the United States must deploy a fleet
of space-based weapons to defend itself in
space.8 He made no mention of the threat
China posed to other allied nations or their
possible contributions to the U.S. response.

some of the same risks of growing human
activity, particularly due to the finiteness of its
main, usable resources (geostationary orbital
slots, radio frequencies available for
broadcasting, and safe access to low-Earth
orbit). All of these resources are becoming
stressed by increasing human space activity.

Historical conditions of anarchy in the
international system have contributed to a
tendency among leaders to conceive mainly of
national responses to international threats.
States are already organized for national
defense, countries are jealous of spending
scarce resources in potentially risky ventures
with foreigners (even allies), and there are
relatively low levels of trust regarding the
reliability of international organizations. But
three factors have altered global dynamics in
the last few decades, each of which has an
important space component that supports the
creation of an allied approach to space.

Second, economic globalization is an
increasing fact of life. Unlike during the Cold
War, when the world was dominated by two,
nearly self-sufficient blocs, changes in the
international economic system (due to both
political and technological factors) have made
commercial exchange possible across almost
all political boundaries, vastly increasing
global trade. Interdependent economic
relationships are the rule in U.S. ties with our
NATO and Asian allies and even, in some
areas, with commercial partners like Russia
and China. Similar to many industries, the
commercial space industry has become truly
international and now generates $161-billion
in sales,9 making it a valuable resource for
both national governments and the global
economy more generally. Technologies built
in one country are frequently owned and
marketed by another and are sold to clients in
yet another. Strong corporate alliances have
already been formed in the space industry, for
example, linking Russian rocket motors with
U.S. launch vehicles (International Launch
Services) and U.S. sub-orbital flight
technology with British funding and
marketing (Virgin Galactic). With some
offshore corporations like Intelsat, it is often
difficult to tell which individual country a
space enterprise actually “belongs” to.
National militaries are also purchasing
bandwidth on a large number of commercial
satellites, causing the breadth of a country’s
“critical assets” to expand. Some of these
assets are already shared with other nations,

First, the scale of multinational interactions to
deal with shared problems is increasing due to
the growing “finiteness” of the globe, as the
world’s population continues to expand and as
communications technologies become more
intrusive and more widespread. Indeed, the
very nature of the problems countries are
facing is changing as the Earth becomes
“smaller”: almost all free land and airspace
(up to 100 kilometers) have been claimed by
nations (or otherwise allotted by international
law), the sheer scale of industrial pollutants is
beginning to have global effects, and such
resources as clean air and water are becoming
increasingly scarce. Other problems, such as
climate change, are becoming recognized as
requiring an international response. Despite its
comparative vastness, near-Earth space faces
8

“China’s ASAT Test and American National Security,”
remarks by Senator Kyl at the Heritage Foundation, January
29, 2007, posted on the Globalsecurity.org website,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2007/space070129-kyl01.htm (accessed February 1, 2010).

9

News Briefs, “Satellite Industry Revenues Topped $160B
Globally in ’09,” Space News, June 14, 2010, p. 8.
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although not in a joint operational sense. Yet
devoted military space cooperation between
countries remains highly restricted, a
characteristic that is out of step with these
integrationist trends.
Third, in military affairs,
questions of international legitimacy are
placing a growing emphasis on the need to
conduct operations via coalitions. Put simply,
the unilateral use of force is seen as
increasingly unacceptable within the
international community. Largely for this
reason, the United States fought under a U.N.
mandate in 1991 in the Gulf War against
Iraq’s intervention into Kuwait and in Libya in
2011; it fought under a NATO mandate in the
Balkans and now under both UN and NATO
mandates in Afghanistan; and it fought (less
“legitimately” from the perspective of the rest
of the world) with an ad hoc coalition of
friends and allies in 2003 in Iraq. Indeed,
there is a growing literature on the need for
some international approval even for
humanitarian interventions by military forces
in the modern era.10 Ironically, given these
pressures to cooperate in military activity,
space remains an outlier. Unfortunately, the
U.S. military has found by experience in
Afghanistan that national barriers have
impeded its effective use of space-derived
data. As one recent analysis of the problem of
information-sharing in Afghanistan observes,
“secrecy often keeps coalition team members
from speaking about space-related topics with
each other.”11
These points raise a critical “process”
question: How do countries come to realize
that their security needs in a particular area of
10

See, for example, Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms
of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.,
The Culture of National Security and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
11
De Selding, “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition
Forces Hinders Use of Space Assets in Afghanistan.”

activity have crossed the line from national to
international? Realist political theory argues
that security, by its very nature, is something
that falls to states, as the essential building
blocks of the international system and the
repositories of sovereignty within it. Yet
space is an area specifically delineated as
beyond national sovereignty by international
law in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The
failure of states to expand collective
governance mechanisms in regard to space
may be a factor of habit, perspective, and
inertia, plus normal bureaucratic opposition to
negotiations aimed at creating new,
specialized institutions beyond national
control.
Recent threats to U.S. space assets have been
viewed as national security threats because
there is a long U.S. tradition of self-reliance in
international relations and a perspective that
successful collective action is rarely achieved.
But, in space, all countries have an interest in
protecting the environment from military
threats and, in fact, from
any obstacles to either
“To pursue selffree access or free
interest does not
passage. These
require
conditions create
maximizing
fundamental incentives
freedom of
for collective action that
do not exist in other
action.”
areas of international
relations. Ironically, one of the primary
obstacles to enhanced collective action to
protect space security may be the thinking of
the actors themselves, which still remains
largely rooted in the unilateral traditions of
security provision from past security
frameworks. But, as Robert Keohane argues,
“To pursue self-interest does not require
maximizing freedom of action. On the
contrary, intelligent and farsighted leaders
understand that attainment of their objectives
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may depend on their commitment to
institutions that make cooperation possible.”12
Working with allies, therefore, may represent
the best security solution available at this
point in space history, and perhaps may serve
as a bridge to broader forms of international
cooperation in the future. Alliance-based
efforts could mitigate a variety of emerging
space-related security concerns. The prior
existence of allied military institutions—
particularly established patterns of costsharing, integration, joint operations, and joint
training—both in the case of NATO and in
various bilateral arrangements with Asian
countries (such as Australia, Japan, and South
Korea) should reduce typical collective action
problems in forming such new mechanisms
for space.
Roots of a Multinational Approach to
Space Security
Notably, there is a long history of attempted
transnational approaches to space security.
Space activity actually began in the context of
a major multilateral scientific initiative known
as the International Geo-Physical Year (IGY).
Both the Soviet Union and the United States
announced plans to orbit satellites as part of
their contributions to the IGY—and the
Soviets got there first. However, any hope of
using international science cooperation to
promote international security in space soon
fell to the wayside, given the context of the
hostile competition between the Soviet Union
and the United States.

11

space through collective means in the face of
threats of territorial claims, damage caused by
ongoing nuclear tests in orbit, and disputes
over future liability questions. As mentioned
above, the further codification of space rules
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty helped expand
the notion of space as an extra-territorial realm
with a range of collective restrictions on
military activities, particularly on the Moon
and celestial bodies. The bilateral ABM
Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks Interim Agreement (SALT I) in 1972
prohibited space-based missile defenses and
interference with national technical means of
verification (i.e., satellites). The 1972
Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects further
expanded the norm of mutual restraint in
space and provided evidence of the
willingness of even the world’s most powerful
militaries to cede areas of space sovereignty to
collective agreements in order to help ensure
safe and reliable access. As Larry Wortzel
observes, “The U.S. and the Soviet Union
seemed to realize that it is potentially
destabilizing to define the upper limits of
sovereignty. Thus, neither country interfered
with the other’s free passage in space. Also,
they agreed that the ability to conduct strategic
verification from space stabilized the nuclear
balance.”13 Although, joint military activities
were not possible in the poisoned political
environment of the Cold War, important
norms of space restraint did emerge between
the two superpowers despite their political
tensions.

Yet multilateralism in space did not die
entirely. Two critical UN resolutions passed
in 1963 and the ratification of the Partial Test
Ban Treaty helped safeguard safe access to

In the early 1990s, the two formerly most
hostile enemies took unprecedented steps after
the Soviet break-up in civilian space
cooperation, joining with Canada, Japan, and
the countries of the European Space Agency

12

13

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 259.

Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese
People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare,” Astropolitics,
Vol. 6, No. 2 (May-August 2008), p. 128.
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in the construction of the International Space
Station (ISS). This $100 billion civilian project
is still ongoing and has linked the human
spaceflight programs of all major space-faring
countries, except China and India. Despite
occasional glitches, it has worked remarkably
well and has served U.S. interests. The U.S.
commercial sector has become similarly
international, including significant
cooperation with Russia in the space launch
field. But little such effort has been made to
promote allied or other transnational space
security engagement, particularly in
operational programs.
Since the Soviet break-up and the rise of U.S.
skepticism of the need for further space arms
control, bilateral space security norms from
the Cold War have failed to spread adequately
among new space-faring nations, such as
China. As Wortzel points out, in contrast to
the history of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations in
regard to space, “No such dialogue has taken
place with China.”14 Wortzel blames
opponents from the People’s Liberation Army
for blocking initial U.S. overtures late in the
Bush Administration. Others blame the
United States for rejecting talks on space
security from 1998 to 2009 at the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Put
simply, the United States did not perceive a
demand for such a dialogue until China’s
ASAT test in 2007. This neglect now seems
short-sighted. What is more surprising is that,
until very recently, there has been little
engagement between the United States and its
allies in space security matters. Indeed, with
the exception of some limited studies in the
NATO context, no overarching framework for
allied space cooperation to enhance space
security has emerged in the post-Cold War
period.

As noted in the introduction, the existing
framework for space security remains
problematic, and there are few new initiatives
to address these gaps. The one exception to
the current stalemate occurred in December
2007, when the countries of the United
Nations agreed to adopt a voluntary set of
U.S.-supported debris mitigation guidelines,
providing a limited set of norms. But the
effort still fell far short of halting non-WMD
weapons testing or deployment in space, even
kinetic-kill tests, allowing such activities as
long as the debris was short lived. It also
created no international system for space
situational awareness or enforcement, relying
only on national means. As for treaties, the
only proposal on the international agenda is
the Russo-Chinese Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty
(PPWT)—a limited effort focused only on
banning space-based weapons. However, the
proposal exempts testing and development of
other space weapons, such systems as China’s
ground-based ASAT, thus severely diluting
the utility of such an agreement. The more
limited, European-sponsored Code of Conduct
has been informally available for comment
since December 2008, but—even if agreed
to—will offer only partial effectiveness
toward increasing space security given its
voluntary status and its lack of specific
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.15
As of late March 2011, the United States had
only announced its support for the “process”
of the code’s elaboration, not for the
document itself. Russian and China have
flatly opposed the effort. Under these
conditions, it is not yet possible to make the
jump to a fully inclusive international space
security arrangement or treaty. In the
meantime, the United States and its allies
15
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might be well served to start building their
own cooperative security network as a critical
first step. Such a move would enhance U.S.
and allied space security and perhaps serve as
a model that can be expanded upon later, if
other actors see benefits in joining the system
(and the allies agree to such engagement).
To date, the concept of multinational space
cooperation has been perhaps best exemplified
in the European Space Agency’s (ESA’s) civil
space programs, which are collectively
organized, funded, and implemented. The ISS
case is another example of successful civilian
cooperation, bringing together the United
States with ESA countries and Russia. Of
course, other countries have cooperated in
joint scientific and commercial projects as
well, but almost none in the security realm.
Even in Europe, space security cooperation—
particularly in operational terms—has been
very limited. Similarly, a review of the recent
U.S. literature on space security reveals how
little attention has been paid to concepts of
possible military alliance-building for space.
With a few exceptions, the topic has been
largely ignored, due to the enduring
propensity of most authors to view space
security from a purely nationalistic lens. This
is even true within the academic community.
A few examples are worth examining to
highlight this point.
Everett C. Dolman’s well-known book
Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the
Space Age (Cass, 2002) argues that a single,
major power (presumably, either the United
States or China) will eventually exercise
“space dominance” over other actors.
Because of this assumption, he fails to
consider seriously the possible role of alliance
contributions to such strategies, arguing that
all other powers will simply be forced to
comply with the rules established by the
hegemon, rather than themselves establishing
a multilateral structure. The concept that an
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alliance of countries might dominate
collectively is not considered, although
Dolman concedes that sustaining such a
offensive-oriented, state-centric approach to
achieving space security is “in the long
term…counterproductive and detrimental.”16
Similarly, Benjamin S. Lambeth’s otherwise
very thorough coverage of space challenges
Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next
Steps in the Military Uses of Space (RAND,
2003) fails to refer to the possible contribution
of allies at all, assuming perhaps that U.S.
allies have no space assets worth considering.
U.S. Navy Commander John J. Klein’s book
Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and
Policy (Routledge, 2006) mentions allies on a
handful of occasions but only in a very
theoretical context, such as the need to rally
support from allies in case of facing a superior
space power. Yet there is no discussion of
what such countries might contribute in an
operational sense in a conflict, much less
consideration of the peacetime creation of a
space-based alliance as part of a strategy of
orbital deterrence. Notably, the Bush
Administration’s 2006 National Space Policy
does not mention U.S. allies in the section on
“National Security Space Guidelines,” except
in a vague manner as possible recipients of
U.S. space-derived intelligence data under
certain, limited circumstances.17
Among authors more supportive of
international space cooperation, Joan JohnsonFreese’s book Space as a Strategic Asset
(Columbia University Press, 2007) discusses
the failure of NATO to come up with a unified
space policy, in part due to the fact that “to
date, most European military space programs
16
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have been strictly national programs.”18 She
contrasts this failure with their highly
integrated cooperation in the civil space field.
Nevertheless, she remains skeptical of the
ability of U.S. NATO allies to make
significant contributions to U.S. space
security, except in a supporting role. In other
areas of space activity, however, JohnsonFreese cautions that unduly restrictive U.S.
export controls could stimulate civil and
commercial space partnerships among China,
Russia, and the countries of the European
Space Agency (including many leading
NATO members).
USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Forrest E. Morgan’s
highly informative report Deterrence and
First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary
Assessment (RAND, 2010) makes the case
that the United States cannot expect to address
its space vulnerabilities simply through threats
of national retaliation, which are unlikely to
be effective or convincing in space. Instead,
Morgan argues for a mixed strategy of
“threatening a range of punitive responses in
multiple domains while at the same time
reducing the benefits of enemy attacks by
improving defenses, dispersing and concealing
space capabilities, and demonstrating the
ability to rapidly replenish whatever losses are
sustained.”19 Somewhat surprisingly,
however, Morgan’s prescriptions fail to
mention the potential role of allies in carrying
out such a strategy, perhaps because of the
difficulties of overcoming traditional secrecy
concerns.
Within the literature, therefore, there are
relatively few supporters of new allied space
structures. One of the few exceptions is
Steven Lambakis’s book On the Edge of
18
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Earth: The Future of American Space Power
(University of Kentucky, 2001). Although
Lambakis portrays space largely within a
realist-driven framework of military struggle,
he does consider the possible contribution of
allies, noting “The United States will need the
political support of its allies and friends as
well as their involvement in military space
activities, to include economic contribution
through collaboration in system development
and participation in operations.”20 He
concludes by arguing in regard at least to
ground stations and surveillance, there are
“undoubtedly several contributions U.S. allies
can make in these areas.”21 A more recent
study by USAF Lt. Col. Michael P. Gleason
goes further in spelling out why the specific
political-economic situation of the second
decade of the twenty-first century is ripe for
such efforts, arguing, “With U.S. budgets
constrained and U.S. security space programs
lagging, now is the time to partner with the
EU [European Union] in security space.”22
USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Peter Hays makes the
supporting argument that “State-of-the-art
constellations…can be augmented with stateof-the-world capabilities to make these
capabilities more resilient.”23
With some exceptions, this review of some of
the leading recent studies of space security
shows that there has been inadequate attention
paid to the prospects of truly allied strategies
to accomplish shared goals of space threat
reduction, deterrence, and defense. Part of the
20
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reason, perhaps, is the general lack of
familiarity among U.S. space experts with the
emerging capabilities of allied space actors.
Given the highly classified world of space
operations, many military and governmental
analysts simply tend to focus on keeping track
of U.S. capabilities and problems. Similarly,
existing U.S. export control restrictions make
some forms of cooperation simply impossible,
depending on the level of technology
exchange involved. Congress too has been
leery of funding any form of cooperation that
might seem like “foreign aid” in space, and
has only grudgingly gone along with civil
spaceflight purchases from Russia, despite the
coming break in U.S. capabilities to deliver
astronauts to the ISS.
But the United States has global military
responsibilities and depends heavily on its
space capabilities to fulfill them. It also works
closely with allies on the ground, at sea, and in
the air, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. Yet as the 2009 NATO assessment
laments about the state of members’ space
assets: “[our] essential capabilities are at risk
because we simply have not thought through
the Alliance’s Space needs, developed any
strategy, considered the consequences of no
action, or prepared any risk mitigation
strategies.”24 As a result, the study complains,
“The current approach to Space is piecemeal,
a bottom-up effort lacking overarching
structure or direction.”25
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leadership and partnership.”26 Although the
NSSS provided few specifics, it pledged that:
“With our allies, we will explore the
development of combined space doctrine with
principles, goals, and objectives that, in
particular, endorse and enable the
collaborative sharing of space capabilities in
crisis and conflict.”27 Implementation,
however, remains in its initial stages only.
With these challenges and opportunities in
mind, it is now worth considering what
specific advantages might accrue to U.S.
space security from a closer partnership with
allies in this regard, as well as how such a new
military space partnership might actually be
formed.

Getting from Here to There: Building a
Layered Framework for Policing Space

The 2011 National Security Space Strategy
marked a major turning point in official U.S.
thinking about allied space activity when it
recognized that in an “increasingly congested,
contested, and competitive” environment, the
United States faced new “opportunities for

Despite the risks facing U.S. space assets, the
challenges for an adversary seeking to carry
out a sustained campaign against space assets
in multiple orbits in a non-cooperative context
are still difficult. Redundancy and
reconstitution strategies could potentially be
very effective against limited attacks. To the
extent that a group of allied spacefaring
countries could create a network of interactive
satellites and develop policies for mutual
support in a time of crisis, such efforts could
greatly reduce even the risk of individual
attacks on satellites, since any gaps could be
quickly filled in and therefore rendered
pointless. However, the United States and its
allies are a long way from establishing this
capability. This raises two related questions:
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what countries should be involved and what
capabilities should be linked?
While the U.S. military has so far failed to
form true space partnerships with other
countries, there has been a rapid expansion in
the space capabilities of allied militaries in the
past 15 years. France has led the way in
launch capabilities and Earth imaging
(including for military purposes), but an
additional five NATO countries—Canada,
Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom—operate more than 10 satellites
apiece for remote-sensing, communications,
and scientific purposes. Meanwhile, Spain,
the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and
Turkey each operate more than five satellites
and associated ground stations.28 Although the
vast majority are civilian satellites, their
militaries are becoming steadily more
involved in space. Among U.S. allies in Asia,
Japan is a major spacefaring country with
extensive human spaceflight and space science
experience, as well as valuable technology in
its H-II Transfer Vehicle (used for the
International Space Station), launchers, and
communications satellites. In fact, a recent
statement issued on the 50th anniversary of the
U.S.-Japan alliance by U.S. Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy
specifically highlighted “the need to
strengthen our cooperation under the alliance
to promote the security of the global
commons, including space and cyberspace.”29
In addition, South Korea has increasing
experience in reconnaissance,
communications, and satellite manufacturing,
while moving steadily toward space-launch
capability. Australia, Taiwan, and Thailand
also have significant satellite operations

experience. Finally, India is a highly capable
space power as well, with launch systems to
both low-Earth and geostationary orbits,
reconnaissance assets, extensive space
applications experience, and an expanding
pool of skilled personnel. This broad-based
collection of space capabilities represents a
major, untapped U.S. resource for dealing
with its space vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is fair
to say that the United States has an
“asymmetric advantage” over countries like
China and Russia in having a host of
significant spacefaring countries that are also
military allies or friends. Yet almost nothing
has been done to use this advantage to shape
the emerging space environment to benefit the
United States and its partners, or to set an
example for other countries worldwide in
responsible space behavior. Instead, as the
2009 NATO space assessment describes,
current regulations make space information
and operations “‘too sensitive’ to discuss
outside of National boundaries.”30
But a study of NATO’s emerging space needs
by USAF Major Thomas Single argues, “The
emphasis must be on moving from a ‘need to
know’ to a ‘need to share’.”31 Time also may
be of the essence. As
Lt. Col. Gleason points
“The emphasis
out, the European
must be on
Union—given its
moving from a
growing range of space
‘need to know’
assets—is “perfectly
to a ‘need to
willing to develop its
share’.”
dual-use security space
capabilities,
architectures, and institutional structures
without US involvement.”32 The same might
30
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be said of Japanese and South Korean
capabilities in a few more years, without U.S.
input. Thus, a priority should be placed on
building partnerships from the ground up as
these systems evolve in order to, in Gleason’s
terms, influence the development of
capabilities “in ways which will benefit
American national security for decades into
the future.”33
While U.S. national security space programs
need to be protected in this process, it is also
worth observing that the United States has
already shared sensitive data successfully with
a range of countries in the nuclear sector,
including with the United Kingdom and
France. Moreover, officials and military
officers from Germany and Australia have
long cooperated with the United States on
sensitive matters related to national defense
including, in Australia’s case, operating
extremely sensitive facilities related to spacederived intelligence and early-warning
information. Thus, the view of space
operations as “too sensitive” to share may be
an out-dated perspective, particularly as risks
to assets rise and demands for cooperation
increase. Under these conditions, a range of
possible means of reducing threats to U.S. and
allied systems might emerge through
cooperation, with additional benefits in
providing the framework for deterring harmful
acts and perhaps building bridges with other
responsible spacefaring nations. Such efforts
would require amendment of existing and
highly protective U.S. International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). But many officials
and military leaders have been calling for
exactly such reforms for years. Assuming that
these controls could be modified to allow
greater cooperation, what areas might be most
fruitful for such allied networking?

First, the United States and its allies need to
know where spacecraft are in orbit and where
threats from orbital debris (whether intentional
or not) might arise. This requires keeping
track of both active and inactive spacecraft
still in orbit. Today, the U.S. military operates
the Space Surveillance Network, which has
the world’s most extensive catalogue of space
objects. Since the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos
collision, the U.S. Air Force has begun to do
more complete conjunction analysis and to
share this information with other space users.
At the same time, U.S. allies could
supplement this effort by providing
information from their radar systems. In
particular, U.S. NATO allies operate a number
of radars and telescopes at multiple sites in
Europe that could be used to bolster joint
capabilities.34 Japan is also beginning research
on space-based surveillance via satellite that
could in the future yield additional useful data,
particularly on microsatellites and their
activities. Improved space situational
awareness (SSA) through allied cooperation
may be critical to determining interference
with spacecraft and determining fault, as well
as building international coalitions to establish
the “ground truth” necessary for levying fines
on space users, depriving perpetrators of
access to space business, stripping them of
rights to geostationary slots, or cutting-off
frequency allocations for broadcasting
satellites. Accordingly, the 2010 U.S.
National Space Policy calls upon the U.S.
government to “Enhance capabilities and
techniques, in cooperation with civil,
commercial, and foreign partners to identify,
locate, and attribute sources of radio
frequency interference, and take necessary
measures to sustain the radiofrequency
environment in which critical U.S. space
34
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systems operate.”35 Similar techniques need to
be developed against laser, microwave, and
other hostile technologies.
A second priority area after SSA is ensuring
the continuation of service for global
positioning, navigation, and timing networks
like the U.S. Global Positioning System
(GPS). The development of this satellite
constellation has provided tremendous
benefits to the U.S. military in being able to
improve accuracy and reduce collateral
damage and deaths with its weaponry, as well
as assisting in a range of other military
functions. Europe’s planned Galileo system,
Japan’s Quasi-Zenith system, and India’s
future GAGAN system could provide
important supplemental data should the GPS
system ever be threatened by hostile actions in
space. By ensuring compatibility among these
networks and arranging for quick replacement
responsibility within the constellation in case
of attack, the United States and its friends and
allies could guarantee that GPS information
would be available in any future crisis.
A third critical area is reconnaissance.
Currently, the United States relies on a
relatively small number of large, highly
expensive satellites in low-Earth orbit to
provide high-resolution images on critical
adversaries or problem areas. Due to the risk
of their loss, the rising costs of such
spacecraft, and the need for more data, the
U.S. military has already begun contracting
with such commercial firms as DigitalGlobe
and GeoEye to provide imagery that, while
not as precise, is good enough in many
instances. Working with allies would provide
yet another source of imagery in case of the
loss of any U.S. military or commercial
satellite in a crisis. These systems might
include Japan’s Information Gathering
35
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Satellites, Germany SAR-Lupe system,
France’s Helios (and future Pleiades), and
Italy’s Cosmo-Skymed.36 South Korea also
operates imagery satellites, as does the United
Kingdom. Unfortunately, even in conflict
zones such as Afghanistan, there has been
little cooperation to date due to the lack of
established mechanisms and strong
countervailing traditions of space secrecy.37
Such problems could be overcome through
establishing protocols for exchanges of
information as well as possible designation of
certain satellites as “allied,” whether under
NATO auspices or a larger space cooperation
entity that would include non-NATO U.S.
allies as well. These capabilities would ideally
evolve over time toward development of a
common software interface, if not certain
shared hardware to promote interoperability
and replacements. Joint training of officers
could support such a system, thus developing
core expertise across the alliance that would
serve to expand effective use of space imagery
on the battlefield and in peacetime.
Surprisingly, excluding U.S. military space
personnel (which numbered approximately
100), only one non-U.S. space professional
was serving in the Middle East Area of
Operation as of 2009.38 Clearly, this is far
from adequate.
As a fourth priority, communications and
early-warning satellites located in
geostationary orbit should be secured.
Fortunately, this job is the easiest given the
difficult of carrying out an undetected attack
on an object at an altitude of 22,300 miles.
Still, the United States and its allies should
first develop mechanisms for replacing critical
36
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functions in case of problems. They should
also begin outreach with other parties—
including China, which is not covered by
U.S.-Russian non-interference pledges—to
respect the inviolability of early-warning
satellites, in particular, given their role in
promoting nuclear stability. Clearly, China
should understand that any attack on an earlywarning satellite could be legitimately
mistaken as part of the first stage in a major
nuclear attack and would trigger extreme
means of defense by the United States and its
allies.
A fifth area for allied cooperation is that of
developing avoidance mechanisms—in other
words, decoys and quick replacement
capabilities to protect satellites. This is better
done in concert with multiple parties than
unilaterally due to the advantages of having
multiple platforms available and multiple
launch sites. This could include developing
standard, interoperable reconnaissance
satellites and other critical spacecraft and
locating them in different allied launch sites
around the world. In a future world of
cubesats, this kind of integration may become
easier (and more affordable) than it is
currently. Allies could also fly decoy satellites
in their constellations to increase the burden of
numbers on potential attackers, or collectively
develop and deploy spoofing systems or chaffreleasing pods to foil enemy radar seekers.
Sixth, in case a satellite or spacecraft engaged
in harmful activity would need to be stopped
by the collective forces of a cooperating group
of major space-faring powers, having the
collective ability to deter, disable, and, if
necessary, to destroy hostile space assets may
be necessary in extreme circumstances. These
could include existing ballistic missile defense
assets (such as the U.S., Japanese, and South
Korean Aegis systems and Ground-Based
Interceptors in the United States, future
MEADS-type interceptors in NATO, and
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perhaps other assets). Their use against a
rogue actor would have to be coordinated by a
joint space council of the allied powers. Such
moves have critics and would need to be
considered carefully for their possible effects
on space security more generally. That is,
while there is a temptation to take the next
step to allied deployment of orbital space
weapons in order to supplement new
redundancy capabilities and currently limited
ground- or sea-based counterspace weapons,
further steps may be unwise, at least absent
new threats. Lt. Col. (ret.) Morgan argues in
response to calls in some quarters supporting
deployment of space weapons and policies of
attempted space dominance, “While such
arguments resonate with those acculturated in
the U.S. military tradition, it is hard to
conceive how placing counterspace weapons
in orbit would do anything to defend U.S.
satellites from enemy ground-based weapons
or, for that matter, other weapons in space.”39
Morgan observes that such weapons
themselves would be in fixed orbits and
vulnerable to attack. He adds: “Taking this
step may also encourage other spacefaring
nations to follow suit, ultimately resulting in a
dangerously unstable strategic environment
that would generate severe ‘use-or-lose’
pressures.”40
Finally, any allied approach to space security
would likely have to create a functioning
transnational, operational body to manage
share systems, provide joint training, and
handle finances. The 2009 NATO assessment
concludes by calling for a Space Office at
NATO headquarters as well as a NATO Space
Operations Coordination Centre.41 But, given
the desirability of involving allies from Asia, a
broader center seems to be more prudent.
39
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Access to the operations center would have to
be strictly controlled through both a
classification system and personnel reliability
program. As noted, such efforts have
succeeded in the past at sensitive NATO
nuclear locations and at space sites in
Australia. The program would have to start
small and perhaps with a limited numbers of
countries most heavily involved in space
already: Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
South Korea.
From this author’s informal discussions,
support for such a cooperative space network
seems to exist already among a number of
NATO members and in Australia, Japan, and
South Korea. The U.S.-Australian
announcement of planned SSA cooperation in
the fall of 2010 and joint funding of the
Wideband Global Satcom system mark
important first steps toward operational
integration. Notably, these trends are
consistent with the 2010 U.S. National Space
Policy’s call for new types of cooperation at
the international level, including in the area of
national security space. Indeed, the section on
“National Security Space Guidelines” goes
even further in spelling this out: “Options for
mission assurance may include rapid
restoration of space assets and leveraging
allied, foreign, and/or commercial space and
nonspace capabilities to perform the
mission.”42 These guidelines point to
additional useful paths forward.
A supporting mechanism to begin building the
model outward to friends and other
responsible spacefaring nations—such as
India, Israel, and others—might be patterned
on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
This concept emerged in 2003 as a means of
filling gaps in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) for stopping the illicit transit of
42
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weapons of mass destruction and related
technologies, materials, and delivery systems.
This Bush-Administration-inspired “coalition
of the willing” began to organize voluntary
national military and law enforcement efforts
into a process that would allow inspection and
seizure of crews and contraband. Such a
model may be useful for space as well.
Another supporting concept for collective
space security might be the U.S. Navy’s idea
of creating a large coalition of international
assets to engage in collective maritime
security: the 1,000-ship navy.43 As Admiral
Mike Mullen describes the maritime model,
this would be a “global maritime partnership
that united maritime forces, port operators,
commercial shippers, and international,
governmental and nongovernmental agencies
to address mutual concerns.”44 Mullen views
it as a voluntary network of maritime powers
“interested in using the power of the see to
united, rather than to divide.”45 For space, this
could include commercial and scientific
spacecraft as well and would thus involve
many more players—functioning like an
active “neighborhood watch” committee. The
practical experience of international efforts to
combat piracy off of the Horn of Africa may
provide a positive lesson in regard to the
future “policing” of space.
Despite the advantages of creating such an
allied network for space, it must be admitted
that a number of current obstacles exist to
such efforts. Traditional U.S. thinking about
U.S. exceptionalism in space would have to be
revised and a more egalitarian view of alliance
partners adopted. The U.S. State, Defense,
and Commerce Departments would need to
engage in ITAR reform and craft new
military-to-military agreements (of the type
43
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the U.S. has with Australia) to allow the
sharing of space information. In Congress, a
new political willingness to fund space
systems that would not be solely for national
benefit or under purely national control would
need to emerge. At the technical level, new
integration with allied industry would likely
be necessary to create common standards and
interfaces, which would initially cost time and
money. Still, given the emerging risks in
space of and the possible benefits to be
achieved by joint efforts, these problems do
not seem insurmountable.
Conclusion
The challenges of space security today are
typically viewed today as a state-centric
rivalry for space supremacy: a highly
nationalistic framework best suited to
unilateral actions.46 The context of traditional
balance-of-power politics, therefore, has
colored the lenses of most observers, leading
to predictions of a state-versus-state
showdown in space, similar to great battles of
naval armadas in centuries past. However,
under changing conditions, such a stove-piped
view of space cooperation and operational
practices may make
less and less sense
Pooling
and may even
resources may
increase risks to
be the most
U.S. and allied
effective
space assets.
Moreover, given the means of
building new
tightening financial
situation in most
capabilities.
allied countries
today and in the United States itself, pooling
resources may be the most effective means of
building new capabilities. As the 2009 NATO
46
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21

spaced report concludes, “Increasing fiscal
constraints demand increased cooperation to
create synergy, reduce duplication of effort
and ensure interoperability.”47
This effort could begin with joint training
among existing allies with more advanced
military space experience and gradually
building outward to include those allies with
still-developing capabilities. During this time,
the more advanced militaries could begin to
establish an information network to support
operational cooperation and eventually feed
into a proposed allied space organization. As
the assets of this body are developed,
operational control could gradually be
transferred from national to allied
mechanisms, thus providing greatly enhanced
peacetime deterrence and, when necessary,
increased effectiveness in the use of
conventional forces on the ground, at sea, and
in the air. Over time these institutions and
practices could transform the business of
space security from a national into an allied
enterprise, spreading risk, reducing individual
costs, and increasing reliability. Part of the
future-leaning agenda of such an organization
might be to explore possible contacts with
countries like India, Russia and, eventually,
even China, in order to make restraint-based
conflict prevention mechanisms for space
truly international.
As noted above, the United States is in a
uniquely advantageous situation compared to
China in having highly capable space partners
who are also military allies. As China space
expert Gregory Kulacki argues, “China is
concerned about the general effort of the US
during the Bush Administration to form a
Japanese-Indian alliance to contain China,”
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including in space.48 But Washington needs to
be careful not to overplay its hand. Building a
collaborative alliance in space to reduce
vulnerability could be seen as destabilizing by
outside parties. Specifically, building an
offensive-oriented space alliance, as noted by
Morgan, is likely to threaten China and lead to
hostile reactions and possibly a space arms
race. For this reason, the United States and its
allies need to be careful about their rhetoric
and, when possible, be inclusive in terms of
confidence-building measures with other
countries, portraying the alliance as
defensively oriented and non-threatening to
other countries. Paths to cooperation with
other parties through confidence-building
measures, participatory space situational
awareness, and community “policing” of
space to identify bad behavior (such as
jamming or laser interference) should also be
encouraged. New rules and even treaties
might be considered later based on the noninterference norms and newly established
collective security practices developed by the
alliance.
In this context, collaborative efforts in allied
space security may be a good first step toward
reducing space vulnerabilities and helping the
world avoid action-reaction arming for space
and its harmful effects. But this active
cooperation in space security, even among
existing U.S. allies, will take time, money,
technical resources, as well as political
commitments from national leaders, given
existing national security barriers. Yet the
negative implications of alternative paths that
are foreseeable for space make these
challenges worth addressing head on. If this
process is to succeed, moreover, it should
begin soon, before new risks to U.S. and allied
space security—and further offensive testing
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by potential adversaries—emerge as
alternative space norms.
	
  
	
  
	
  

The 2010 National Space Policy:
Down to Earth?
Joan Johnson-Freese
Naval War College

The 2010 National Space Policy, intended “to
express the President’s direction for the
Nation’s space activities,”1 was released by
the Obama Administration on June 28.
Responses were for the most part swift and
predictable. While drawing heavily from past
consistent principles, all analysts agreed that
the tone and emphasis differed significantly
from the 2006 Bush Administration policy,
which itself was a departure from past policies
in terms of a greater military focus and
nationalistic orientation.2 Views on which
tone and emphasis is best has ranged along the
ideological spectrum. A sampling of opinions
is indicative. Baker Spring, from the
conservative Heritage Foundation, focused on
the Bush approach to space being “right” as
much or more than analyzing the Obama
policy.3 Jeff Keuter at The Marshall Institute
provided a useful side-by-side comparison of
the language, in part, it seems, toward
establishing that the Bush policy was
consistent with past policies and therefore any
The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and
do not represent the official position of the Department of the
Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. I
would like to thank Dr. Tom Nichols, CMDR Scott
McPherson, Ph.D., and Victoria Samson for their views on
earlier drafts. Responsibility for the views and information
contained in the article, however, remains solely that of the
author.
1

Fact Sheet, The National Space Policy, The White House,
June 28, 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/fact-sheet-national-space-policy
2
Joan Johnson-Freese, “The New U.S. Space Policy: A Turn
Toward Militancy?” Issues in Science and Technology,
Winter 2007.
3
Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy:
Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,”
Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010.

changes in the Obama policy required
explanation for the shift.4 Michael Krepon at
the Stimson Center positively noted the
difference between the Bush and Obama
policies regarding Obama’s renewed openness
to consider diplomatic initiatives toward
strengthening U.S. international leadership on
space issues, but cited a lack of specifics about
potential initiatives, appearing disappointed
that the policy did not go further.5 Some
analysts thought there were too many details,
some not enough. Experts on a panel held
shortly after the policy was released sponsored
by The Secure World Foundation (SWF) and
The Arms Control Association (ACA) again
noted content consistencies with the past, and
differences in tone from the Bush policy.
Independent analyst Marcia Smith from
SpacePolicyOnline.com said it was “less
nationalistic, more friendly” but noted “she
had a friend” who viewed it as a “policy of
appeasement rather than leadership.” Bruce
MacDonald from the U.S. Institute for Peace
said he for one was “overall quite pleased with
the revised policy”,6 Not surprisingly,
professionals and pundits alike read the policy
4

Jeff Keuter, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy:
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http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=983
6
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much like a Rorschach test, interpreting it
largely based on long-established prior
perspectives. Across the spectrum of opinion,
all acknowledged that the devil is in the
details of implementation.
My own view of the policy is most akin to that
of SWF attorney Ben Baseley-Walker, another
SWF/ACA panel member. He summarized it
as “a very sound, pragmatic approach.” I
would call it simply a realistic policy. It has
both strengths and weaknesses, but overall,
commendably, it attempts to inject realism
into future U.S. space planning, and realism
will ultimately strengthen U.S. security.
While inherently more long-term focused and
therefore less immediately satisfying, it is
important to remember the classic military
requirement for an executable, successful plan
of attack -- alignment of ends-ways-means.
Certainly the requirement for a prolonged U.S.
military presence in Iraq after the initial
shock-and-awe success demonstrated how a
mismatch between those key elements can
result. Unfortunately, looking long-term will
likely not bode well for the Obama
Administration, as the last thing many
American people seem to want, and therefore
politicians will support, is a policy that
recognizes and addresses the changing
realities of the space environment.
Nevertheless, several areas of change in the
policy specifically reflect looking at the world
as it is, rather than how the United States
wants it to be.
Reality as Risky Political Business
Andrew Bacevich in his 2008 book The Limits
of Power: The End of American
Exceptionalism examines President Jimmy
Carter’s 1979 speech to the American people
about self-indulgence (specifically regarding
oil) and what Bacevich terms “profligacy.”
That speech was quickly dubbed “the malaise

speech” by his political opponents, though the
word malaise was never used by Carter. His
opponent for the presidency, Ronald Reagan,
countered with “morning in America” talks
which, Bacevich says convinced Americans
that “credit has no limits, the bills will never
come due.”7 Fast-forward to the October 19,
2009, cover of The National Review. It
featured a cover image of a robed Obama
wearing his Nobel medal while contemplating
a bust of Carter. Clearly Obama is intended to
be viewed as the snooty, contemporary
version of Carter, bearer of bad news and
pessimism.
In some quarters, the contemporary additive to
the malaise rhetoric is that of decline;
instilling fear in the American public that if
we don’t act (panic) now and act aggressively,
America will fall off the precipice of
hegemony and into economic, political and/or
social decline. "Decline," The National
Review cover stated, "is a Choice." Using
declinist images and rhetoric is perhaps to be
expected in partisan politics. However, it is
both hackneyed and hyperbolic; eventually
each cycle of declinism gives way to reality.8
James Fallows in his January/February 2010
article in The Atlantic addresses this notion.
He points out that declinism is woven into our
culture. “Thomas Jefferson was sure the
country was going to hell when John Adams
supported the Alien and Sedition Acts. And
Adams was sure it was going to hell when
7
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Jefferson was elected.”9 While assuring us that
America has historically gone through cycles
of crisis and renewal, he also reminds us that
renewal takes effort, sometimes based on hard
choices, and addressing issues and problems
realistically.10
This pragmatic approach, however, is not the
stuff of the polarized partisan politics sadly
characterizing America today. More typically
seen is the profligacy of which Bacevich
warns, generalized public anger, and a distinct
disdain of expertise – the latter especially
dangerous on issues such as space where the
laws of physics prevail over ideology and
wishful thinking. National security, however,
is not well served by wishful thinking, nor is
realism synonymous with decline. Space
assets are too important as vital national
interests – and stated as such in both the Bush
and Obama policies -- to be subjected to the
facile analysis of “declinism” and “gut”
analysis rather than sound, though admittedly
difficult, realistic strategic planning for a
stable and secure future.
Tone and Leadership
The Obama policy begins with two epigraphs,
one from President Eisenhower and one from
President Obama. These epigraphs speak to
the consistent connection between American
goals in space and improving life on Earth,
and their relationship to American leadership
more broadly. They establish a cooperative
tone and put forth an important justification
for space activity for those who still question
why we spend finite U.S. resources on space
rather than here on Earth.

Here is President Eisenhower in 1958:
More than by any other imaginative
concept, the mind of man is aroused
by the thought of exploring the
mysteries of outer space. Through
such exploration, man hopes to
broaden his horizons, add to his
knowledge, improve his way of living
on Earth.

And President Obama today:
Fifty years after the creation of
NASA, our goal is no longer just a
destination to reach. Our goal is the
capacity for people to work and learn
and operate and live safely beyond
Earth for extended periods of time,
ultimately in ways that are more
sustainable and even indefinite. And
in fulfilling this task, we will not only
extend humanity’s reach in space –
we will strengthen America’s
11
leadership on Earth.

These epigraphs talk about all people being
able to fully utilize space and the benefits it
yields, thereby setting the stage for an
internationally cooperative policy.12
The 2006 Bush policy, by contrast, was either
more assertive and patriotic, or more caustic
and bombastic, depending on ideological
perspective. While domestic opinion was
split, international opinion leaned heavily
toward the latter. The Times of London
perhaps best summed up the international
view in an October 19, 2006, commentary
entitled “America Wants it All – Life, the
Universe, and Everything.” There the author
posited that space apparently was no longer
the final frontier, but the 51st state of the
11
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United States. It went on to say that “The new
National Space Policy that President Bush has
signed is comically proprietary in tone about
the U.S.’s right to control access to the rest of
the solar system.”13
The Obama tone reflects the reality that
leadership cannot be coerced (at least not
indefinitely) and true
leadership requires
…true
others wanting to
leadership
follow. While many of
requires others
the same points are
wanting to
reiterated in the
Obama policy as in the follow.
prior Bush policy, they
are reiterated in less nationalistic language and
recognize that a right declared by the United
States is going to be expected to have
universal application.
Jeff Foust points out a useful example of
difference in tone and language in his article,
“A Change in Tone in National Space Policy”:
For example, the Bush policy stated
“The United States considers space
systems to have the rights of passage
through and operations in space
without interference. Consistent with
this principle, the United States will
view purposeful interference with its
space systems as an infringement on
its rights.” Contrast that with the new
policy: “The United States considers
the space systems of all nations to
have the rights of passage through,
and conduct of operations in, space
without interference. Purposeful
interference with space systems,
13
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including supporting infrastructure,
will be considered an infringement of
a nation’s rights.” The Bush policy
spoke only of interference with US
space systems, while the Obama
policy refers to interference with any
14
nation’s space systems.

If the goal of the United States is to maintain
space as a peaceful, secure and sustainable
environment for the benefit of all - a global
commons - then it must lead by example and
in a way that others are willing to follow. 15
With almost one thousand space assets in orbit
critical to all aspects of our way of life and
security, and almost half belonging to the
United States,16 “stability” is not just a
realistic policy goal, but a security imperative.
It is not in the interest of the United States to
have the space environment (more) littered
and volatile. Bruce MacDonald pointed out
that the 2009 Strategic Posture Review
Commission reached similar conclusions
about space. MacDonald, who served as
Senior Director to the Commission, noted the
commission recommendation “that the U.S.
should develop and pursue options for U.S.
interests and stability in space, including the
possibility of negotiated measures.” This
commission was not a group of left-wing
ideologues; it was six Republicans and six
Democrats headed by former Defense

14
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Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger.17 While
turning from unilateralism and an emphasis on
space war to a new tone of internationalism
and stability is clearly viewed by some as
“weakness,”18 the Obama Administration,
perhaps recalling that the 2009 Schriever V
space wargame clearly demonstrated the need
for allies and partners in times of conflict,19 is
striving for less chest thumping and more
cooperation.
Like it or not, the United States is not the only
spacefaring nation. Other countries
increasingly see space assets as requisite tools
for success in a globalized world because of
the information they yield. They are not
willing to forego their ownership and use, and
in fact are seeking to expand both. This is a
reality the United States must acknowledge
and deal with - as the 2010 policy does rather than trying
Trying to maintain
to discourage and
the status quo so
hinder the use of
that U.S.
space by others,
as has been the
preeminence can
case for those
never be
who see an
challenged is
increase in
unrealistic.
China’s space
capabilities as
inherently zero-sum for the United States. In
other words, trying to maintain the status quo
so that U.S. preeminence (or what some call
dominance) can never be challenged is
unrealistic. Whether other countries with, in
some cases, rapidly maturing space programs
17
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– China, India, Iran, Brazil, and Nigeria, for
example -- will be willing to step up to the
challenge of acting as responsible spacefaring
actors remains to be seen, but it is evident that
the world is not willing to follow a leader who
seems primarily self-interested.
Reasserting U.S. space leadership will pay
important dividends on Earth. The United
States unquestionably “leads” space activity
based on sheer numbers of assets and the
ability to use them. But when considering
metrics such as United Nations’ voting
coalitions on space issues, where the United
States is often in a minority even against our
allies, and the decreasing share of foreign
satellite orders going to U.S. firms, U.S.
leadership has been lacking for some time.
The 2009 National Research Council report,
America’s Future in Space, directly spoke to
space enhancing U.S. strategic leadership on
Earth.
Strategic leadership for the United
States means thinking about the
future in a way that sees beyond
immediate and particularly American
needs and policies – such as assuring
access to resources or a temporary
military advantage – and positioning
the nation to help set an agenda for
worldwide action. In considering both
its own national interests and benefits
to humankind, the United States
should aim for more than immediate
solutions to transitory problems and
should find approaches that seek to
20
shape the future.

Effectively re-asserting American
leadership will help create a more
stable and predictable environment in
space and more realistically allow the
United States to shape a secure and
prosperous future.
20
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Using all U.S. Tools to Protect
Our Space Assets
In admittedly simplistic terms, the
United States has four basic categories
of “tools” available to implement its
policies abroad: diplomatic,
informational, military and economic –
sometimes referred to by the acronym
DIME. Alone and in combinations,
they represent the spectrum of U.S.
power.
Since the end of the Cold War,
however, “power” has become a much
more complicated concept. No longer
does power simply equate to kinetic, or
“hard,” power deliverable by platforms
that can be counted and countered.
Joseph Nye coined the term “soft
power,” though initially Donald
Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense,
said he didn’t “know what that
means.”21 Walter Russell Mead
distinguished between sharp power
(military), soft power (cultural power,
the power of examples), sweet power
(values, culture, and policy, and setting
the agenda) and sticky power
(economic).22 At her Senate
confirmation hearing, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton took these a step
farther, calling for the United States to
execute “smart power,” a combination
of diplomacy and defense, to restore
American power.23 Clearly, the United
States is preeminent in its hard, or
21
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sharp, power capabilities. After the
invasion of Iraq, the United States was
viewed by much of the world as
relying too heavily on the military
sharp power tool, and as a first choice.
But in a globalized world populated
with transnational and non-traditional
threats and challenges, not all are
effectively dealt with by kinetic power.
Increasingly, effective abeyance
requires coordinated international
efforts, and reliance on hard power and
coercion is counterproductive if they
alienate those with whom we must
work to be successful.
All the tools of U.S. power must be
available. The United States must be
willing and able to use its sharp power
if necessary, but it shouldn’t be the
first or only option, and it may not be
the best option. The 2006 policy states
that the United States should “develop
capabilities, plans, and options to
ensure freedom of action in space, and,
if directed, deny such freedom of
action to adversaries.” The 2010
policy instead uses the language
“develop capabilities, plans, and
options to deter, defend against, and if
necessary, defeat efforts to interfere
with or attack U.S. or allied space
systems.” The Obama space policy
recognizes the potential for using hard
power, but also recognizes that such
use (and the debris it creates) could be
damaging to U.S. assets as well, and so
adjusts the tone to encourage
cooperation, and opens the door to a
greater use of diplomacy. That door,
though rhetorically not completely
slammed shut during the Bush years,
had de facto been largely ignored.
What increased diplomacy will mean
in practice remains to be seen and will
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not be without difficulties. What
stance the United States will take at
future United Nations Conference on
Disarmament meetings and votes will
be indicative. For many years the
conference has pursued an agenda item
called “Prevention of an Arms Race in
Space” (PAROS). While the United
States has since 2002 cast the only
“no” vote against a resolution to
establish a working group on PAROS,
in 2009 it switched its vote to an
abstention – a small but significant
step in the right direction.
Additionally, another resolution, this
one Russian-led, called “Transparency
and Confidence-building Measures in
Outer-space,” encourages states to
submit concrete proposals on
international confidence building and
transparency measures to the U.N.
Secretary General. While the United
States voted “no” in 2008, it declined
to participate in 2009, thereby
allowing the resolution to be adopted
by consensus.24 The United States had
previously been a consistent obstacle
to furthering such cooperation. This
obstructiveness had allowed China and
Russia, the two countries which have
set forth proposals for a treaty banning
the use of weapons in space and the
transparency resolution, to portray the
United States as opposing peace in
space and as perhaps its greatest threat.
U.S. rhetoric, through the 2006
National Space Policy, and actions at
the United Nations, made it
understandable that other countries
would accept this portrayal.
It is unlikely that the United States will
(or even should) support a space
24
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weapons treaty. The United States
generally has not been favorably
inclined toward
multilateral
It is unlikely the
treaties in
United States
recent years,
will (or even
dating back to
should) support
the Clinton
a space
Administration.
weapons treaty.
Alternatively,
Ben BaseleyWalker refers to the potential for “softlaw” options toward actions
management.25 This could include
efforts such as Codes of Conduct, or
Rules of the Road, which have drawn
increasingly support from European
countries, commercial organizations,
and even from within the U.S.
military26 - indeed anyone seriously
interested in protecting the space
environment.
The idea is that actors should and can
learn to manage their actions toward a
stable and sustainable space
environment. When the United States
tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon
in 1985 by destroying its Solwind
satellite, and China tested its ASAT in
2007, neither explicitly broke any
specific “rules” or laws.27 But each
25
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created a substantial amount of space
debris potentially dangerous to other
spacecraft. The United States
subsequently adjusted its manner of
testing, as a matter of self-interest.
China, after the rightful international
condemnation it suffered consequent
to its debris-creating 2007 ASAT test,
seemed to learn as well. When China
tested similar technology again in
2010, the test was characterized as a
missile defense test and conducted
more along the political and technical
lines of what the United States did
when it deliberately destroyed its
malfunctioning USA-193 at a lower
orbit, indirectly rather than explicitly
testing ASAT technology, thereby
avoiding both political condemnation
and the creation of lingering debris.
As a matter of fact, China created the
biggest space mess in history with its
ASAT weapon in 2007, at the very
time the United States was aiming for,
or claiming, space dominance. That
test deflated if not dispelled
completely the idea that the United
States could technologically protect its
space assets by constantly playing
defense better than anyone else could
play offense. The Chinese quickly and
harshly demonstrated both the
ineffectiveness of bellicosity and the
tenuousness of space dominance. It is
possible to establish air dominance
over a specific area for a limited time.
The same is true for sea control. But
unless the United States is willing and
able to shoot down anything that
anyone launches that we don’t approve
of, anytime and anywhere – and deal
with the consequent creation of an
orbital debris mess, to say nothing of
potentially igniting a war – claiming
dominance leaves the United States to

preach that others should “do as we
say, not as we do.”
Implementation Complications
The single-most complicating
factor in space policy stems from the
vast majority of space technology
being dual-use, over 90% by most
approximations. The term “dual-use”
has two equally important meanings:
1) that the same basic technology has
applications in both the civil and
military sectors, and 2) that it is often
difficult to distinguish whether
military space technology is intended
for defensive or offensive use. Much
of the world considers investment in
dual-use technology a good investment
since it can be used for multiple
applications. The United States,
however, with its more highly
bifurcated civil and military programs
than other countries (and with larger
budgets), largely considers dual-use
technology as an opportunity for
countries like China, Iran and North
Korea to develop military technology
for nefarious use under civilian guise.
For example, imagery satellites are
neutral in themselves; the way the
imagery they produce is used whether for crop rotation or targeting
weapons - determines whether it is a
civil or military asset, or in the case of,
for example, the Japanese Information
Gathering Satellite (IGS) system,
both.28 By some U.S. accounts, nearly
all Chinese space assets are military,
though often very similar
28
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technologically to U.S. civil programs.
In another case, as long as the United
States pursues missile defense, some
countries will consider the United
States as having an (offensive) antisatellite capability because the
technology is so well-suited for the
ASAT mission. The selfcongratulatory American media
coverage after the successful
intentional destruction of USA-193
basically confirmed that ASAT
capability to the world. “The
unprecedented downing of an errant
spy satellite by a Navy missile makes
it clear that the Pentagon has a new
weapon in its arsenal – an antisatellite
missile adapted from the nation’s
missile defense system.” 29

“strengthening stability in space”
through “domestic and international
measures”31 and elaborated on in
discussion regarding preserving the
space environment.32 Ideally that
might mean a treaty to prohibit certain
debris-creating actions. Realistically,
however, ratification of such a treaty
would likely evoke a partisan battle in
the Senate, framed as between those
who want to protect national security
and those who are willing to forego it
for the sake of soft international goals.
Bacevich sees the former group as
supporters of an “Ideology of National
Security” that allows American
profligacy - and reality avoidance - to
prevail.33

Though space has long been
militarized, the Bush Administration
continued to assert that the Rubicon of
actual space weaponry had yet to be
crossed. 30 But dual-use technology
blurs the line between militarization
and weaponization considerably.
While the Obama Administration has
backed away from initial indications it
would ban space weapons, it has
encouraged instead other avenues for
“actions management” - ways to
distinguish between legitimate military
uses of space and weaponization, or at
least to discourage weaponization.

Policy language that “The United
States will consider proposals and
concepts for arms control if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and
enhance the national security of the
United States and its allies” could also
present real difficulties in making that
ideal occur, to the likely
disappointment of many. Under what
circumstances, for example, could a
space treaty be considered verifiable?
Though verification has long been
considered a potential “stopper” for
space arms control mechanisms, there
are efforts underway to specify
conditions for verifiability from both a
political and technical perspectives.34

Strengthening measures to mitigate
orbital debris, an example of “actions
management,” is given a special nod as
part of the stated 2010 policy goal of

31
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Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Spy Satellite Downing
Shows a New Weapons Capability,” Washington Post,
February 22, 2008, A03.
30
Although Baker Spring says in his July 6, 2010 Webmemo
that “space has been weaponzied since the dawn of the space
age.”
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Though still preliminary, it is
heartening that discussion has begun
rather than simply being assumed to be
“too hard.” In the meantime, efforts for
debris management, support for
increased space situational awareness,
and the fragile support for arms control
indicate a more likely path toward
actions management, rather than the
creation of a legal regime that may not
be able to be enforced anyway.
Equally important, while the Obama
Administration clearly wants to return
U.S. space policy back to within
mainstream international views, it
must do so within domestic
considerations. Politics is the art of
the possible, not the ideal. Thus, while
those who would support a treaty
actually have a realistic view of the
debris problem as one unsolvable by
hard power unilateralism, a treaty is
just as likely an unrealistic approach to
solving it. Creativity will be at a
premium.

consistently, findings fall along three
general axes: lower launch costs, more
cooperation between the civil and
military space communities, and more
commercial involvement. We have
known the necessary goals for some
time, yet all remain elusive. Since
President Obama clearly intends to
rely considerably on commercial space
for achieving his human spaceflight
plans, as became
We have known
clear with the FY
2011 NASA budget the necessary
request, more
goals for some
appears to be riding time, yet all
on this iteration of
remain elusive.
the expanding
commercial space
effort of “fixing space” than in the
past. This pragmatic approach seems
necessary as the U.S. human
spaceflight program has, since Apollo,
often been funded by unsupportable
methods, somewhat analogous to using
a Mastercard to pay off a Visa. So this,
again, is an attempt at a realistic
approach to an old problem.

JetBlue to Space?
A plethora of studies and
commissions, particularly in the
1980’s and 1990’s, have looked at how
to “fix” space, meaning how to more
effectively utilize government
resources and grow the space
development field.35 Fairly
35

See, for example, Pioneering the Space Frontier, the 1986
report of the National Commission on Space; the 1987
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Advisory Committee on the Future of the US space Program
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This pragmatic approach has not seen
universal acclaim; the cancellation of
the Constellation program brought
American-hero astronauts Neil
Armstrong and Eugene Cernan out
from retirement to protest. They
claimed the move was “devastating” to
the space program and that Obama’s
new plan was a “blueprint” to get to
“nowhere.”36 Their angst is
understandable. It is like watching the

and A Post Cold War Assessment of US Space Policy, and the
1992 National Research Council report From Earth to Orbit.
36
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auto plants in Michigan close up and
move to Mexico. But both candidates
Obama and McCain realistically had to
tell voters in Michigan that those auto
manufacturing jobs weren’t coming
back. In the same vein, economic
realities have left President Obama to
tell disappointed space enthusiasts that
the Constellation program was being
cancelled. This is a particularly bitter
pill to swallow during very difficult
economic times, as jobs were
subsequently lost in key aerospace
states like Florida, Alabama, Texas
and California. Nonetheless, the adage
“only poets write strategy without a
budget” comes to mind when
retrospectively viewing the
Constellation program from its roots in
the 2004 Bush Vision for Space
Exploration speech.37 The reality is –
as supported by the report of the 2009
Augustine Commission,38 specifically
created to advise the President on the
human spaceflight program –
Constellation, as it stood at the time of
cancellation, suffered an irrecoverable
ends-ways-means mismatch such as
discussed prior. As the program stood,
potential success was an illusion.
Based on the cancellation of
Constellation and his speech in April
2010,39 the Obama Administration
appears to have largely heeded the
advice of the Augustine Commission.
37
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The commission recommended taking
a flexible approach to exploration if
significant budget increases were not
forthcoming, which were not. Obama’s
epigraph at the beginning of the 2010
NSP says the United States’ goals in
space go beyond “a destination to
reach.” Coupled with the cancellation
of Constellation, it is clear we are no
longer racing the Chinese (back) to the
Moon, a race we handily won against
the Soviets in 1969, but in which we
stood a good chance of losing this time
around. Likely anticipating the outcry
from those at a loss without
destinations and timetables, however,
it also states the United States will
“begin crewed missions beyond the
moon, including sending humans to an
asteroid” by 2025 and “by the mid2030s, send humans to orbit Mars and
return them safely to Earth.”40 Clearly
these were intended to reassure
skeptics that the future of human
spaceflight remained a priority.
Personally, I think it was a mistake to
include timetables for which there are
no programs authorized or funding to
achieve them. The political will to
fund human spaceflight to a level
commensurate for success within a
timetable is unlikely to be any stronger
for a new program than it was to fund
Constellation. This is where (and why)
the commercial sector is being counted
on to step up.
That commercial, civil, and national
security space sector guidelines for
policy implementation are listed in the
2010 National Space Policy beginning
with the commercial space sector and
ending with national security space
sector has been analyzed with
40
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Talmudic scrutiny. Those who
consider space-related national
interests as equating first and foremost
to the national security space sector
have cited that ordering as indicative
that national security has been
subordinated to arms control in this
NSP.41 Government strategies are
intended to be in alignment like
“nested” Russian dolls, one fitting
within the other. If the NSP is nested
within the National Security Strategy
(NSS), as is likely and intended, then
the space sector prioritization is not
really surprising. While the 2006 NSS
began with the words “America is at
war,”42 clearly and unequivocally
focusing America on the fight against
terrorism, the Obama NSS begins with
a note of change.
Time and again in our nation’s
history, American’s have risen to
meet – and shape – moments of
transition. This must be one of those
moments. We live in a time of
sweeping change. The success of free
nations, open markets, and social
progress in recent decades has
accelerated globalization on an
unprecedented scale. This has opened
the doors of opportunity around the
globe, extended democracy to
hundreds of millions of people, and
made peace possible among the major
powers. Yet globalization has also
intensified the dangers we face –
from international terrorism and the
spread of deadly technologies, to
economic upheaval and a changing
43
climate.
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The importance of national security is
not downgraded, but it is being defined
more broadly and realistically. In
terms of space, “change” means
attempting – and I say attempting in
recognition of past efforts – to bring
space development to a path more
similar to other areas of high-tech
development rather than the anomaly it
has been. Whereas airplanes and
computers required government
investment as seed money to then
(relatively quickly) allow a
commercial sector to flourish, in
human spaceflight, the tipping point
for the commercial sector to overtake
government efforts has yet to occur.
More than fifty years after John Glenn
orbited the Earth, the government still
controls tickets to space much
differently than passengers booking a
ticket on Jetblue, an aberration in an
era of globalization.
Globalization has meant that
capabilities like high resolution
imagery, once available only to
security communities in a very few
countries, are now available on the
commercial market. Globalization also
means that countries are connected in
ways that change how they can act and
react in shaping and coercing the
actions of others. Ben Baseley-Walker
illustrates that point well when it
comes to space. “If, for example, the
United States blows up a Chinese
satellite, what would I do if I were
sitting in Beijing? Would I go and
launch a missile at an American
satellite? No, I would crash the
dollar.”44 Space is a different venue
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than it was during the Cold War when
governments controlled all assets, and
hard power ruled the day.
Despite the best attempts of some
entrepreneurs, human spaceflight has
remained largely the purview of
governments. Some of those best
attempts have taught investor
billionaires that space is an arena
where large fortunes can quickly
become small ones. PayPal founder
Elon Musk got into the space launch
business and founded the SpaceX
Corporation, subsequently saying: “I
want to be able to make sure that we
have enough capital to survive at least
three consecutive failures. If you want
to make a small fortune in the launch
vehicle business, start with a large
one.”45
Where the Obama policy offers new
hope for the heretofore unattainable
goal of commercial viability is in its
definition of the commercial sector,
including the omission of a previously
laudable but unrealistic parameter.
According to the NSP, commercial
space “refers to space goods, services,
or activities provided by private sector
enterprises that bear a reasonable
portion of the investment risk and
responsibility for the activity, operate
in accordance with typical marketbased incentives for controlling cost
and optimizing return on investment,
and have the legal capacity to offer
these goods or services to existing or
potential nongovernmental

customers.”46 A major change in this
policy is the removal of a clause
forbidding direct subsidies for
commercial space, a ban included in
both the Bush and Clinton policies.
The apparent intent is to move U.S.
commercial space activities onto a
level playing field with most other
spacefaring nations. Is the Ariane
rocket, for example, marketed through
Arianespace, a commercial space
venture? It is certainly categorized as
such within the international launch
market, but the majority of shares are
owned by the French government.47
The French government also invested
heavily in its development. The United
States appears to be moving in the
direction of this model, which other
countries have long utilized. Again,
there is no guarantee that the
commercial sector will step up to the
challenge, but trying to change the
status quo model to a more realistic
and sustainable approach over the
long-term is laudable.
From Muddling Through to a
Realistic Approach?
It has been apparent for some time to
those who scrutinize space budgets and
timetables that a day of reckoning was
coming, sooner rather than later. That
day has arrived. In human spaceflight
and exploration, you get what you are
willing to pay for. Without a viable
commercial sector, it is largely up to
the American public, through their
Members of Congress, to decide what
46
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they need, in accordance with what
they want to spend.
While there are those in Congress who
are angry and vocal over the
cancellation of Constellation
(including the loss of jobs in many of
their districts) it must be remembered
that Congress can always reallocate
funds into the space budget if there
really is enough political will to do so.
In the early years of NASA, Congress
provided more money than the agency
requested in their eagerness to counter
Soviet space achievements. Today,
however, with competition for federal
funding running the gamut across
social welfare programs, job stimulus
programs, on-going war efforts,
domestic infrastructure, the
environment, education, health care
and more, human spaceflight will
likely find itself with more rhetorical
support than actual funding.
The President has said space is a vital
interest of the United States, but there
are finite resources to meet infinite
possible interests. Though rhetorically
supportive, the American public
largely sees space exploration and
development as admirable, but more
expendable than schools, roads, health
care, tax cuts and other priorities.48
The Obama policy sets a way forward
to try and achieve realistic goals within
realistic budgets. It will require
unprecedented levels of cooperation
48
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with other countries and reform of
Cold War-era, ham-fisted, complicated
export control laws to allow the United
States to work with other countries and
revitalize its competitive place in the
international
aerospace
The Obama
market.49 The
policy will require
illusion that we
unprecedented
can defend space
levels of
technology
cooperation with
exclusively with
technology has
other countries.
been debunked
and overcome by events, specifically
the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. Yet
whether the Obama Administration has
the political capital to push the
execution of this policy forward, and
the political will to spend that capital
on this issue, remains to be seen.
Recognizing and choosing a new path
forward, one perhaps less “visionary”
in the short term, could be more
realistic in the long term. The auto
manufacturing jobs are not coming
back to Michigan and Ohio, and the
United States is not going to be
standing on the Moon in 2020. But
resistance to change will still be
strong.
Already there are signs that short-term,
muddling-through advocates will not
give up easily. The Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and
Transportation unanimously agreed in
July to an authorization bill plan to cut
Constellation, but initiate development
of a heavy-lift rocket in 2011,
49
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potentially to be ready for use by the
end of 2016. Again, politics being the
art of the possible, that compromise
provides jobs in aerospace states for
politicians and near-term action for
those who demand them. Not
surprisingly, the money to start work
on the heavy-lift vehicle will not be
new money, but will be sliced from
funds the administration proposed for
developing new space technologies
and commercial efforts. Also, since
the Senate bill only covers the next
three years, it is unknown what will
happen after that.50 So again, funding
problems have not been realistically
solved, just put off for somebody else
to deal with.
There will be those who will resist
change in time-honored ways: slowrolling, dwelling on difficulties with
past change efforts (just too hard),
magnifying risks, and pointing out
potential personal power impacts.
Baker Spring warns against arms
control agendas that “effectively
circumvent the Senate’s constitutional
role in consenting to the ratification of
international agreements that should be
concluded as treaties.”51 While
certainly not advocating a treaty, he
also objects to anything short of a
treaty (such as a Code of Conduct) effectively reinforcing the “status quo”
- by cautioning the Senate that its
power could be circumvented.
Additionally, there are those in
government and in Congress especially
(on both sides of the aisle) who will
oppose any sort of cooperation with

37

China on ideological grounds.52 There
are also those who will oppose the
NSP on simple partisan grounds. But
the time for profligacy is over, and the
time for renewal and reality-based
decision-making is here.
Those who have been pushing for the
United States to move toward space
dominance, to include the development
of space weapons, under the guise of
offensive-defensive capabilities or any
other guise, will just have to try to wait
out the President. While President
Obama will likely not ban them, he
also is unlikely to promote them. There
are parallels in the space sector to that
of the nuclear sector – where the
President has said he wanted to move
to “zero” but has found the path there
strewn with political compromise and
efforts by nuclear modernization
stalwarts to “hold on” for the future.
Space weapons advocates will likely
do the same.
The 2010 NSP offers a blueprint for
renewal rather than a blueprint back to
the Moon, or a space battle plan. The
challenge for NASA is to develop –
quickly – innovative, affordable and,
yes, inspiring, plans to take America
forward in human and robotic space
exploration. The commercial sector’s
challenge will be not only to facilitate
NASA’s plans, but also to innovate
and implement plans of their own to go
beyond NASA and truly develop
space. The challenge for the military
is to protect space as an environment
for use by all, but especially the United
States, without relying on potentially
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counterproductive, debris-creating,
extremely expensive and technically
unfeasible hardware. Taking up these
challenges will yield not just benefits
in space, but benefits regarding U.S.
strategic leadership on Earth and in
international security. The new
blueprint offers new technical goals
and opportunities ahead, and the
revitalization of our strategic
leadership. All are realistic goals
worth pursuing. If we ignore them in
favor of short-term, status quo
approaches, it will ultimately be at the
peril of U.S. national security.
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

Operationally Responsive Space:
Past, Present and Future
Stuart Eves
Surrey Satellite Technology Limited

The Past
Where did the idea of Operationally
Responsive Space originate? You might
imagine that the idea was born during the First
Gulf War, (sometimes called the First Space
War), where use was made of strategic space
systems to support operations. It was apparent,
though, that strategic systems with very small
fields of view and long revisit times were not
well suited to operational reconnaissance.
Other limitations of these strategic systems
included a tasking system not suited for
tactical timelines; significant data downlink
requirements, making it difficult to deliver
data into the theatre; a large in-theatre
“footprint” for intelligence analysts; and lack
of “command assurance” that the requested
collection would not be pre-empted by higher
national priorities, for which reason field
commanders were unwilling to place reliance
on them for critical operations. It is tempting
to think that these limitations inspired system
designers to conceive of constellations of
smaller, more affordable satellites with wider
fields of view.
But in 1991, while the West was struggling to
adapt the operations of its satellites to meet
the demands of the conflict situation, the
Russians were launching optical and RF
surveillance satellites at an impressive rate. If
the ORS programme does ever succeed in
launching 18 low Earth orbit surveillance
satellites in a four-month period like the
Desert Shield operation, it will simply be
emulating what the Russians achieved 20
years ago. In the same period in 1991, the

West launched just one military mission, and
had Russia chosen to engage in that conflict, it
is clear which side would have possessed the
“information edge”. Analysts in the West
quietly doffed their caps to the “operationally
responsive” space programme in Moscow,
who had comprehensively demonstrated a
“Tier-2” launch-on-demand capability long
before the concept was formally articulated in
the West
And the Russians didn’t stop there. In the mid1990’s they fielded a system called Arkon,
which had an astonishing level of tactical
capability. Placed in a high-altitude LEO,
(with an apogee of 2750 km and a perigee of
1500 km), this large mission, (which would be
considered a “Tier-1” asset in today’s
responsive space terminology), was able to
deliver imagery with a resolution of better
than five meters over enormous fields of
regard. In the summer months, when the
lighting in the Northern hemisphere was at its
best, this single satellite could have provided
between 8 and 10 images of a given point on
the Earth’s surface per day, and its highaltitude orbit would also have provided
frequent opportunities for commanding and
data dissemination.

The Russian Arkon Satellite
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The Arkon satellite had a repeating ground
trace, allowing it provide repeat coverage
from the same point in space when required.
This capability allowed the imagery from two
consecutive days to be compared very easily,
highlighting changes which would focus the
attention of the analysts on areas of interest
within the very large imagery scenes.
The Arkon satellite was large – it required a
Proton launch vehicle to place it in orbit – but
it was also agile. Illustrations released by the
production organization in Russia showed at
least four different modes of operation,
including imaging of point targets, of areas, of
lines of communication, and a mode in which
the satellite could be trained on a specific
location for tens of minutes if required.

from a satellite platform weighing just 120 kg.
For a satellite that cost less than $20m to build
and launch, this mission set a new
performance threshold. By the time TopSat
was launched in 2005, the U.S. tactical space
programme had commenced, and had assigned
the designators TacSat-1, TacSat-2, TacSat-3,
etc. Since TopSat preceded these US missions
into orbit, collaborative experiments were
conducted with U.S. researchers and TopSat
was designated TacSat-0.

The Arkon Satellite’s Operational Modes
Once again, analysts in the West doffed their
caps!!
The Present
Tactically oriented satellites in the West have
taken a different path, based on much smaller
hardware, but it was not the United States who
took the lead. Built in the United Kingdom,
the TopSat satellite set a world record for
“resolution per mass of satellite” by delivering
better than three meter resolution imagery

The TopSat satellite and one of its images of
Kirtland AFB, NM
The specific technical trick that TopSat
employed was to pitch backwards quite
deliberately as it passed over its targets. This
pitching motion slowed the effective ground
rate of its sensor, allowing more light into the
camera system, thereby getting close to the
diffraction-limited performance of its 20 cm
aperture telescope. This level of agility is only
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possible with small, rigid satellites. Large
platforms are seldom capable of achieving the
angular rates required; and generally initiate
vibrational modes that demand significant
“settling time” before acceptable quality
imagery can be collected.
But TopSat’s pitching trick permits two other
advantages that are key to ORS. One is that, if
deployed into a sun-synchronous orbit, the
satellite is no longer constrained to a local
time of ascending node close to noon. It is
able to extend the range of local times of day
when imagery can be collected by pitching
through a larger angle; compensating for the
comparative lack of reflected sunlight near the
terminator by slowing the ground rate of its
sensor still further. The other key advantage is
that a satellite like TopSat is no longer
constrained to operate in a sun-synchronous
orbit. If a satellite is deployed into a lower
inclination orbit, (to provide more frequent
revisits over operational regions, for instance),
it is inevitable due to the laws of orbital
dynamics that it will pass over its targets at
different local times of day. For a larger
satellite, this might be a problem, but for
TopSat it simply means selecting an
appropriate pitch rate for the local time of day
and the prevailing lighting conditions.
The low cost of the TopSat mission
demonstrated the potential affordability of
constellations of small satellites to provide
significantly greater timeliness, but to date it
is Germany which has exploited the
constellation concept most effectively for
military purposes. Germany now has two 5satellite constellations at its disposal; the
military SAR system, SAR-Lupe, and the
commercial RapidEye optical imaging system.
SAR-Lupe and RapidEye are specifically
designed to operate as constellations with
much better revisit characteristics. The
RapidEye constellation is comprised of small
agile satellites which can roll off-nadir,
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meaning that the constellation can provide
imaging opportunities over the entire globe at
least once per day. And the SAR-Lupe
satellites are equipped with an intersatellite
link system which enables the satellites to
transfer commanding information when they
come within view of one-another and thereby
enhance the response time of the system.
In an ORS context, both these systems would
be regarded as “Tier-1” capabilities, in that
they are already “on-orbit”. However, they
differ from the assets that have traditionally
been assumed to comprise Tier-1 because they
are not strategically oriented, single satellites
being pressed into service as inefficient
tactical surrogates.
These systems differ philosophically from the
missions in the TacSat and ORS programmes
in at least three key respects:•

Firstly, they are clearly designed to
operate as part of a constellation, (which
affects all aspects of the satellite design,
including both the payload and the
platform). By contrast, the U.S. systems
have yet to clearly indicate the “objective
systems” that might result if the TacSat
and ORS experiments are deemed
successful.

•

Secondly, they are being used to support
commercial and strategic applications
whilst in orbit. It is arguable that one
reason why the ORS programme in the US
has not gained more momentum is that it
is seeking to find funding for missions
which, if only used over operational zones,
are only going to be exploited for 1% or
2% of the time. Clearly the value for
money from a satellite is greatly enhanced
if it can also be used to support other
missions, such as homeland defense;
commercial collection; operational
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training; and the requirements of allies
elsewhere on the globe.
•

Thirdly, they are expected to be launched
once constructed, rather than being held on
the ground as a series of sub-systems. For
a commercial system like RapidEye, there
is clearly a significant “opportunity cost”
involved in having valuable hardware on
the ground rather than in orbit, and even in
the case of a military system such as SARLupe, the pace of change in small satellite
design means that hardware can rapidly
become technically obsolescent if kept in
storage for too long, (which some might
suggest was the fate of the original
TacSat-1 payload)

Now it might be argued that it is very difficult
to design a satellite that can be used to support
all these differing requirements, and this may
once have been true. However, sensor and
payload technology has advanced to the point
where the agility of small satellites can
support a number of different modes of
operation. The SSTL-300, which is due for its
first launch in May 2011, is a prime example.
Some of these modes presume detailed
advanced knowledge of the target regions, and
so are more suited to strategic surveillance,
whereas others cover larger regions and can
provide support to operational and tactical
missions. Moreover, the satellite is equipped
with both wide area cameras and a high
resolution camera on the same platform. This
is analogous to the way that the human eye
operates, with the lower resolution, wide-area
“peripheral vision” cameras providing
detection and cueing data for the higher
resolution, small area camera that provides the
high fidelity imaging.

The SSTL-300 imaging satellite
So where have the major successes of the
ORS programme occurred to date? One of the
principal achievements was the inclusion of
both imagery and Radio Frequency (RF)
surveillance sensors on the TacSat-2 mission.
To extend the analogy with the human sensing
system, this satellite had ears as well as eyes,
and was therefore potentially capable of
greater “self-cueing”. (In practice,
accommodation constraints and power budget
limitations meant that TacSat-2 was not able
to operate its eyes and ears simultaneously
over the same region of the ground, but it
certainly points towards the future.)
Another clue to the future is provided by the
feedback from the TacSat-3 mission.
Equipped with a small-footprint hyperspectral sensor the satellite demonstrated the
potential value of spectral imagery, if not the
area coverage rate and timeliness required to
support the warfighter.
The Future
As technologies continue to improve, the
contribution that operationally responsive
space systems can make to military operations
will continue to increase. Charge Coupled
Device (CCD) detectors now allow the
imaging of far greater areas than was possible
previously.
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The image below shows the image footprint of
a modern small satellite over Australia. The
much smaller brown stripes across the
continent are the footprints generated by the
Landsat satellites at a comparable resolution.
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collection to the ground – although the raw
data could be downloaded if necessary.
And the nature of the connections available to
transfer this data will also change. At present,
the number of ground stations available to an
ORS system is usually quite limited. This
constrains both the speed with which the
imagery data can be returned, and the overall
capacity of the system, (since the number of
times that the satellite’s on-board memory can
be filled and emptied on a given day will also
be dependent on its access to ground station
facilities).
Those downlink requirements are becoming
more impressive all the time. An example is
SSTL’s Earthmappper system, where a
constellation of 5 satellites, each weighing just
100 kg, now has the capability to image the
entire landmass of the globe on a daily basis.

A comparison of current and historical
coverage rates
Clearly, the increased volumes of data
generated by such sensors demand greater onboard storage capacities, and higher data
downlink rates, but again the rapid pace of
development in terrestrial computing
technologies is providing a solution to these
problems. In the case of the SSTL-300, the
demand for greater downlink capacity is being
addressed via the development of a steerable
data downlink antenna system which can track
a specific ground station with a narrow beamwidth antenna, enabling the available satellite
power to be concentrated into a smaller region
and so deliver a higher capacity link budget.
And as the power of on-board computing
increases, it will become increasingly
common to process the imagery data on board
the satellite, and downlink a much smaller
image file, rather than transfer the raw

Essentially the satellites are “always on”, and
collect imagery whenever the mission is over
the Earth’s surface. The challenge is clearly to
ensure that this valuable imagery is downlinked to the ground, and not trapped on orbit.
In the next generation, it is expected that the
use of inter-satellite links will become
increasingly common on ORS assets.
Currently, such links are generally reserved
for grand strategic systems, but the success of
UAV’s using satellite communication systems
suggests that this will also become routine for
satellites in the future. They are, after all, the
ultimate high-flying UAV’s, and some, (e.g.
ORS-1) are even based on modified airborne
sensor technology!
Another obvious solution to the downlink
issue is to internationalize the ORS
programme, providing the opportunity to
access ground station facilities in multiple
nations at different longitudes around the
globe. A thirteen-nation MOU is currently in
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the process of negotiation, and this has the
potential to start the process of creating the
“Coalition ORS” concept which has been
proposed previously.
Moreover, international collaboration between
the United States and other nations already
exists elsewhere in the space arena. One
example is the use by the U.S. Government of
leased capacity on Paradigm’s Skynet 5
satellites, which were launched to provide
secure communications for the UK MOD
under an innovative procurement process
which transferred significant risk to the
contractor in exchange for a long duration
contract. This arrangement establishes a
precedent which could also be exploited in the
surveillance domain if the UK elects to invest
in a sovereign surveillance system. . The
recently released U.S. National Space Policy
and the DoD National Security Space Strategy
both direct the use of coalitions where
appropriate for both operational and
geopolitical reasons.
As satellites have become essential to warwinning, they have increasingly become the
target for anti-satellite capabilities – both in
space and on the ground. Expect to see
increasing efforts to protect satellites from
such measures by the application of stealth
technologies to the space vehicles and
continuing efforts to harden the terrestrial
networks and infrastructure against all forms
of hostile interference. Augmenting existing
satellite constellations with small satellites
makes intentional or unintentional interference
or denial of the overall capability more
difficult. Additionally, integrating space and
terrestrial capabilities can further enhance the
overall resilience of the system, and although
breaking down “stovepipes” is difficult, this is
another possible medium-term development.

Conclusion
Finally and perhaps most importantly, small
satellites can radically change the calculus
concerning satellite lifetimes. Smaller,
cheaper satellites simply do not have to last as
long as large satellites in order to deliver the
same value for money. As a consequence, it is
logical to consider deploying them in lower,
shorter-lived orbits, and this could modify the
overall approach to ORS enormously.
Satellites closer to the Earth require smaller
apertures and less power, with the result that
the missions can be scaled down to the point
where they become candidates for air-launch.
These new technologies and new capabilities
offer tremendous flexibility that will make the
next generation of satellite constellations truly
operationally responsive.
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ABSTRACT: A strategy to safeguard United
States’ space assets is needed. Deterrence
strategies, like Cold War nuclear deterrence,
are often recommended. Nuclear deterrence
history reveals that deterrence through
dominance is what early strategists employed.
Both Cold War adversaries attempted
repeatedly to gain the lead in nuclear
weapons. Seeking short term advantages
activated the security dilemma and both sides
responded in kind, guaranteeing an arms
race. The faulty logic of the security dilemma
was that the next advantage would bring
security. This did not happen and illustrated
how mutual vulnerability resulted from long
term and determined opposition. That
condition exists to this day, made bearable by
agreements and procedures that reduce fear
through increased transparency and
verification.
The 2001 Space Commission Report identified
the threat of a “Space Pearl Harbor” and
called for military solutions, including
denying space to adversaries. This set United
States’ space policy on a course to repeat the
Cold War mistake of seeking deterrence
through dominance.
The United States’ best option is to abandon
space deterrence through dominance
strategies and accept the inevitable end state
of mutual vulnerability and thereby avoid
engaging in a space arms race. A cooperative
legal framework with transparency to assuage

fear is the best policy, not because of an
idealistic view of benevolent human nature,
but because that will be the end result in the
long run even after great effort and expense to
dominate space.
“I DO BELIEVE THAT MAN’S WISDOM IN
AVOIDING WAR IS OFTEN SURPASSED BY HIS
1
FOLLY IN PROMOTING IT.”
Space capabilities are vital to the United
States. It is critical, therefore, for the United
States to develop an effective long term
strategy to safeguard assets in space.
Deterrence strategies based on the Cold War
example are often discussed as a model for
space. Examining the evolution of nuclear
deterrence reveals, however, that a deterrence
model accepting long term vulnerability
emerged after attempts at deterrence through
dominance strategies failed. The Cold War
experience with two determined adversaries
illustrates how the security dilemma can
spawn an arms race. In the long run, however,
a situation of deterrence based on mutual
vulnerability is the inevitable end state. The
deterrence found in mutual vulnerability is
based on both sides having the ability to inflict
harm. It is deterrence from a position of
reciprocal strength. While dominance in a
1

Robert S. MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,”
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military capability can provide deterrence
while it lasts, it also activates the security
dilemma and any ensuing arms race negates
the deterrent effect just recently enjoyed. In
spite of the Cold War example of unsuccessful
short term dominance strategies, the United
States openly advocated steps toward a
dominance strategy in space with the release
of the Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space
Management and Organization published in
2001 (hereafter referred to as the Space
Commission Report). While deterrence is
cited as the goal for space, some of the actions
called for by the Space Commission Report
can be interpreted as steps toward a
dominance strategy. A possible outcome of
the military’s pursuit of some of the more
aggressive goals set out in the Space
Commission Report is a costly arms race.
History shows that new offensive capabilities
are eventually negated by defensive
countermeasures or countered with greater
numbers of opposing capabilities. Once
begun, arms race momentum is difficult to
reign in. In a competitive global environment,
there is little likelihood that the United States
can maintain space dominance over the long
run. Like the nuclear arms race of the Cold
War, a space policy seeking deterrence
through dominance will yield mutual
vulnerability as the end state. The key to
making deterrence under mutual vulnerability
bearable is to increase transparency in order to
ease fears and build trust. For space, this
requires much better space situational
awareness (SSA) for all concerned parties.
Comprehensive and cooperative SSA will
allow space faring nations to know what is
actually happening in space instead of
defaulting to worst case scenario assumptions.
The best approach to space policy for the long
run is a cooperative arrangement that accepts
mutual vulnerability because that’s the
situation most likely to emerge even after
great efforts to dominate space are made.

The Cold War
“WE DO NOT WANT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION—PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE
ACTION-REACTION PHENOMENON MAKES IT
2
FOOLISH AND FUTILE.”
The last chapters of the Cold War left an
impression that nuclear deterrence was finally
attained after years of effort. Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) is the nuclear
deterrent end state that the world became
familiar with. It involves living under threat
of annihilation because of the reserved
capability to inflict equally unacceptable
devastation upon the enemy.3 This “delicate
balance of terror” continues to keep both sides
in check and is what we have come to know as
nuclear deterrence.4 This idea of nuclear
deterrence—deterrence under mutual
vulnerability—is a strategy that emerged after
attempts at deterrence through dominance
failed. Deterrence through nuclear dominance
was embraced from the outset as illustrated by
the U.S. reaction to the Soviets’ first
successful atomic detonation. The U.S.
response was “to raise the nuclear stakes even
higher by authorizing development of the
hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.”5 This
capability escalation in order to gain, maintain
or regain an advantage continued throughout
the Cold War. The ensuing arms race was
enormously expensive to both sides and
neither felt much more secure for the effort.
2
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Competitiveness and seeking advantage are
part of human nature. Nowhere is this more
evident than in military organizations.
Military leaders are charged with fighting and
winning the nation’s wars. They are
archetypal advantage seekers, an essential trait
their fellow citizens demand of them. It
should come as no surprise that military
thinkers advocate dominance strategies.
There are negative consequences to always
seeking the advantage, however. The most
significant is the “security dilemma”
(originally “security and power dilemma”)
which describes a situation where one nation’s
effort to attain more security, normally
through armaments, serves to threaten the
security of another nation.6 The security
dilemma is the foundation for an arms race—
essentially an action-reaction model.
“Country A is stimulated by B’s arms
accumulation, and what A does by way of
reaction serves as a further stimulus to B….”7
This can become a never ending cycle when
resolute adversaries confront one another,
each apprehensive of the other and determined
to protect itself. It seems a logical choice to
try to attain or maintain an advantage over an
adversary. Unfortunately, the very act of
deterring through military advantages is a
dominance strategy and practically guarantees
an arms race when a determined adversary
exists and has the means to compete. The
irony of the security dilemma and subsequent
arms race is that, despite the incredible effort
and expense, there is little added security in
the long run due to the heightened danger
caused by high levels of armament.
The Cold War illustrates the security dilemma
and resulting arms race very well. At the
6
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7
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close of the Second World War (WWII), the
United States sought to offset Soviet
conventional force superiority by using its
relative advantage, atomic weapons. The
Soviet Union, threatened by this, countered
the U.S. advantage by developing atomic
weapons of its own. The U.S. advantage
eroded under this concerted opposition, so it
stayed competitive by developing the
hydrogen bomb. It did not occur immediately
to advocates of the hydrogen bomb that an
arms race would be the result. The
thermonuclear bomb was a way to stay in the
race and hopefully win.8 This is the
problematic logic of the security dilemma, that
the next advantage will provide the security
desired—the fallacy of the last move. An
arms race is a short sighted plan to garner
security through the “immediate benefits that
temporary superiority might afford.”9 After
embarking down this path, it proved
impossible for either to change course.
When there were 100 nuclear warheads,
deterrence was thought to hold. When there
were 1000, the same was true. At 10,000,
people probably felt about as safe as they had
at 100, and yet the sides continued to build to
more than 30,000. It is estimated that between
1945 and 2000, the United States built 70,000
nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union/Russia
55,000.10
As the security dilemma predicts, both
countries increased their capabilities in a cycle
of action and reaction. By the end of the Cold
War both sides had spent an enormous amount
of money with neither feeling much safer for
the expense.

8
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In addition to matching offensive capabilities,
defensive measures are an important part of
the competition too. In an arms race, each
new offensive capability is offset by defensive
countermeasures which, in turn, spur the next
round of offensive capabilities.11 The Cold
War illustrates this “iron law of weapons
development” which says that any new
capability is countered over time with
technology and procedures to defeat it.12 The
sword was met with armor and shields.
German bombers were identified with British
radar. Submarines spawned sonar and depth
charges. Tanks were attacked with bazookas.
Radio communications were foiled by
jammers. The list is long and the point behind
it paramount. Where a determined adversary
exists, the security dilemma dictates that there
is seldom more than ephemeral advantages.
To avert an arms race, a way must be found to
avoid short term dominance strategies. The
Cold War illustrates the intoxicating logic of
seeking advantage as a way to attain
deterrence, then embracing as rational the
arms race and insecurity it produces.
Nuclear policy began to shift from deterrence
via dominance to deterrence under mutual
vulnerability with the introduction of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
ICBMs represented, in some ways, the
culmination of the offense-defense duel. They
were a relatively safe offensive weapon due to
mobility and hardened facilities and nearly
impossible to defend against because of their
flight path and speed.13 As a result of these
characteristics, ICBMs were fielded with the
knowledge that populations on both sides
would be vulnerable.14 The nuclear arms race
11
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ran its logical course and mutual vulnerability
was the end result. With the realization of
mutual vulnerability came strategies that were
more purely deterrent in nature.15 This is not
to say that deterrence wasn’t sought all along.
It was. However, much Cold War deterrence
was sought through advantage or dominance
strategies, not from positions of equality or
mutual vulnerability. Unlike deterrence
strategies based on some level of dominance,
the new deterrence introduced by ICBMs
accepted the reality of the other side’s
capabilities and sought to manage the situation
somewhere short of conflict. Since deterrence
seeks security through maintaining
capabilities to dissuade aggressive behavior
from the other side, the ideal situation is to
keep that level of military capability at the
lowest possible level. This reduces overall
costs and the inherent danger of large weapons
stockpiles. The huge buildup of weapons
during the Cold War illustrates that the longer
it takes to transition from deterrence via
dominance to deterrence accepting mutual
vulnerability, the more costly and potentially
dangerous the arms race.
Arresting the momentum of the arms race
during the Cold War was difficult to do.
Greater transparency was essential to disrupt
the cycle of fear. This was because military
leaders’ desire for more weapons was often
motivated by the unknown capabilities of their
adversary. Military leaders must plan for the
worst case scenario. Lack of real knowledge
of Soviet capabilities led to more U.S. weapon
acquisitions that fueled the “mad momentum”
of the arms race.16 The Cold War saw bomber
gaps, missile gaps and every other conceivable
capabilities gap which required more weapons
to fill. Closing all of these perceived gaps
gave momentum to the arms race until, after
significant effort and great expense, “both
15
16
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sides gradually came to understand that
transparency…could improve their security.”17
Transparency permitted planning for real
threats, not imagined ones, and allowed the
upward trajectory of the arms race to finally
subside. Arms control agreements were
negotiated and verification procedures
provided the necessary transparency to
gradually ease fears. The end result was a
way out of the arms race with transparency
making the uncomfortable feeling of mutual
vulnerability a bit more bearable.
This is a narrow review of just some of the
dynamics of the Cold War that are applicable
to future space policy. It is not intended as a
complete analysis of the myriad dynamics of
Cold War strategy, policy or decision making.
It is clear, however, that in spite of difficult
debates and agonizing decisions over Cold
War military strategy, both the United States
and former Soviet Union did, in fact, develop
nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands only
to work toward their destruction after the Cold
War thawed.18 Space policy practitioners can
learn some lessons from Cold War deterrence
practices. First, deterrence through
dominance (advantage seeking) is a short term
strategy if a capable and determined adversary
exists. The long term situation will be
deterrence under mutual vulnerability and
acceptance of other nations’ capabilities.
Second, policy makers should recall that the
security dilemma, once activated, can lead to
an arms race which is very difficult to reign
in. Finally, transparency is required to
assuage fears, whether to prevent an arms race
or to end one. These lessons are important to
remember because the United States indebted
future generations with the cost of “winning”

the Cold War and the Soviet Union ceased to
be.
The Space Commission Report
“BUT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS
MONEY SPENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONREACTION PHENOMENON.”19
Fear of losing a vital capability can drive the
security dilemma in the same way as fear of
another’s capabilities. Relative capabilities
and advantages matter most for security
concerns since one nation’s strengths are
important mostly as compared to the strengths
of others. The United States publicly
announced fear of a “Space Pearl Harbor” in
the Space Commission Report.20 This fear has
some parallels to the situation at the close of
WWII. Then, as now, the United States
actually had the advantage. The fear then, as
now, was of losing it. The perceived threat to
U.S. space dominance spurred the United
States to action. According to the Union of
Concerned Scientists database, as of 1 January
2010 there were 926 satellites in orbit. Of
those, 422 were solely U.S. satellites with
another 20 having the United States as a
cooperating partner. This means the United
States operates solely, or has a stake in, 48
percent of all satellites in orbit.21 In spite of
this substantial numerical advantage, the
commission expressed concern. This concern
is founded on one belief in particular. “We
know from history that every medium—air,
land, and sea—has seen conflict; reality
indicates that space will be no different.”22
This logic is similar to the logic that led to the
19
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Cold War arms race. The United States
expected the former Soviet Union to advance
conflict in every way possible, and the Soviets
expected the same. Due largely to this
pessimistic and uncooperative view of human
nature, both nations’ fears were realized in the
arms race that followed. While the
commission’s assessment of conflict in every
medium is accurate, history reveals another
important factor that the commission did not
address. To borrow from the commission’s
statement about history: we know from history
that every military capability—whether in air,
land, or sea—has seen countermeasures;
reality indicates that space will be no
different. This is also an “iron law” from
history and warns of an arms race to follow if
determined opposition exists.23 Policy makers
must deal with both these realities or risk
activating the security dilemma.
The foundational beliefs of the 2001 Space
Commission Report were incorporated into
the 2006 National Space Policy. The
commission’s recommendations set the stage
for a more assertive space policy. The
specific language of the 2006 National Space
Policy that received a great deal of attention is
that of denying space capabilities to potential
adversaries. Joan Johnson-Freese writes that
“although the words ‘space weapons’ are
never uttered, they can be heard if one listens
closely.”24 The assumption is that denying a
space capability to an adversary will require
some type of space weapon, something the
Space Commission Report advocates
outright.25 Whether or not the policy explicitly
calls for weapons in space, its tone promotes
the image of space superiority. The second
paragraph of the policy states that “those who
effectively utilize space…will hold a
23
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substantial advantage over those who do
not.”26 This is the language of competition
and dominance like that of the early Cold
War. An arms race in space could emerge if a
determined adversary with the means to
compete chooses to do so.
An alternative to the aggressive approach
suggested in these two documents seems
unlikely to come from military leadership.
The military is charged with ensuring that if
the nation “calls its sons and daughters to
arms…that they have every advantage in the
field so that they prevail.”27 Gaining and
maintaining capability advantages is what the
military does. Space will be no different.
Indeed, three months after the release of the
Space Commission’s report, General Eberhart
indicated that Air Force Space Command had
supported the commission’s recommendations
“in every respect.” He also noted that the Air
Force chief of staff, General Ryan, had moved
promptly to cut off any nonconcurring groups
within the Air Force to telegraph clearly that
the Air Force had accepted the commission’s
recommendations in principle and was now
deep in the process of trying to determine how
best to comply with them.28
A survey of 75 space professionals attending
classes at the National Security Space Institute
(NSSI) in March 2010 confirms that the
military has internalized the space
commission’s assessment. Of those surveyed,
92 percent believe that space will see conflict,
with 81 percent identifying China as the
primary competitor. An almost unanimous 97
26
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percent believe the United States should
attempt to maintain its current advantage in
space.29 These views represent space
professionals dedicated to a dominance
strategy in space. This was the approach
followed at the start of the Cold War as well—
trying to stay ahead. Predicting what lies
ahead, 69 percent of those surveyed also think
an arms race in space is likely.30 In light of
the near unanimous call to maintain U.S.
advantages in space, this indicates that the
current group of space professionals has
embraced the concept of an arms race to stay
ahead—space dominance.
There is a time to engage in an arms race, but
that time is not now. Participating in an arms
race makes sense if an adversary builds
military capabilities that represent an
existential threat to national survival. During
the Cold War, both the United States and the
former Soviet Union built nuclear arsenals
that could almost completely destroy the
other. Faced with the threat of destruction, it
did make sense for both sides to offset the
capabilities of the other. The faulty logic was
in endlessly pursuing dominance rather than
accepting deterrence and the mutual
vulnerability it implied. Neither the United
States nor the former Soviet Union was
satisfied to stop the arms race unless they
were in the lead. This focus on short term
advantage even when long term mutual
vulnerability was evident is why the arms race
took on such a “mad momentum.”31 All this
effort was ultimately unnecessary since the
condition of mutual vulnerability, once
established, did not change throughout the
Cold War. It is the condition that remains
today. To some extent, the problem early in
the Cold War was unmitigated fear of the
29
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unknown. Lack of real knowledge about
Soviet capabilities and intentions certainly
motivated the United States to participate in
the arms race. After all, national survival was
at stake. Soviet apprehension about the
United States motivated them in the same
way.
Representative of the military dominance
approach to space, Everett C. Dolman,
professor at the Air Force’s School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies, writes that
“the United States should seize control of
outer space and become the shepherd (or
perhaps watchdog) for all who would venture
there, for if any one state must do it, it is the
most likely to establish a benign hegemony.”32
The rest of the world seems not to agree with
this assessment of the United States as an
unthreatening power. The European Union is
developing its own version of the Global
Positioning System (GPS), called Galileo,
illustrating its doubt about the enduring
benevolence of the United States.33 Russia
and China are developing and improving their
own space based navigation systems as well.
This in spite of U.S. assurances that the GPS
signal would never be denied to worldwide
users. China feels that “the United States’
self-appointed guardianship of space is
presumptuous and represents a genuine
challenge to China’s national security
concerns.”34 Rather than speak with words
that the United States might not hear, China
demonstrated an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon
in January 2007, destroying one of its own
satellites in a possible “shot across the bow of
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U.S. military power.”35 Uncontested
hegemony in space is as unlikely as earlier
attempts at nuclear hegemony—opposition is
evident.
Mutual Vulnerability
“FOR IT IS A PROFITLESS WASTE OF RESOURCES,
PROVIDED WE AND THE SOVIETS CAN COME TO A
REALISTIC STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
AGREEMENT.”36

The long term end state in space will be
deterrence under mutual vulnerability, as with
nuclear weapons before. In a competitive
strategic environment, there are essentially
three alternatives to this end state over the
long run. The United States could fight a
preventive war to eliminate an adversary’s
space capabilities so they cannot threaten U.S.
space assets. Absent war, a unique situation
could arise where no competitor emerges to
challenge U.S. dominance in space—a forfeit
win. The final alternative is to compete in an
arms race and win, maintaining the dominance
sought. An examination of each alternative
reveals that, for a variety of reasons, mutual
vulnerability will be the long term end state.
Preventive war is striking a country without
provocation for the purpose of maintaining a
power advantage. This is the most violent
side of dominance strategies where it is
deemed acceptable to wage war rather than
accept a potential threat sometime in the
future. Preventive war is something that
liberal democracies are averse to do since
justification for it usually fails to cross the
political and moral imperative thresholds.
China is the country most often mentioned as
35
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the next potential threat to the United States.
Absent a state of hostilities, it is difficult to
imagine U.S. civilian decision-makers
authorizing a U.S. first strike on China for the
morally indefensible goal of staying in the
lead in space. China and the United States are
also intimately connected through trade and
financial transactions, with China holding a
large stake in U.S. debt. This, and the fact
that the American people are unlikely to
tolerate a preventive conflict to stay ahead in
space, makes preventive war highly
improbable.
Another alternative to mutual vulnerability is
the fortuitous situation where no adversary
emerges to challenge U.S. space dominance.
This thinking often accompanies dominance
strategies. It suggests that U.S. space
capabilities will not be challenged due to the
enormous effort required to catch up. As
previously discussed, the former Soviet
Union’s actions early in the Cold War when
its atomic detonation ended the U.S. nuclear
monopoly undermine this kind of thinking.
An unchallenged position in space today is as
unlikely as an unchallenged position in
nuclear arms was after WWII. China, Russia,
and the EU have signaled various degrees of
dissatisfaction with unchecked U.S.
dominance and, if history is a guide, that
position will not go uncontested over the long
run.
The final alternative to mutual vulnerability in
space is to engage in, and win, a space arms
race. Winning an arms race means the U.S
.maintains space dominance and does not have
to accept mutual vulnerability as the end state.
Winning is not just participating in an arms
race and surviving. Winning means attaining
the goal—dominance. If mutual vulnerability
lies at the end of the arms race then nothing
has been won.

Space and Defense, Summer 2011

The Cold War illustrates that true deterrence is
a strategy that accepts mutual vulnerability,
not dominance. It is certainly true that
dominant military capabilities have a profound
deterrent effect while they last. But deterrence
based on dominance is fleeting. A stable
deterrent end state is based on mutual
vulnerability after the competition subsides.
However, mutual vulnerability doesn’t mean
defenseless. Nor is it a position of weakness.
It is simply the condition that emerges when
neither side can dominate the other, but each
maintains a capacity to inflict harm. This
concept of mutually vulnerable deterrence
already applies to space. Satellites are
practically the definition of vulnerable, flying
predictable orbits with few defenses. Due to
this orbit predictability, lack of defenses and
an inadequate space object identification and
characterization capability, the offense has the
advantage over the defense in space such that
taking out a satellite is relatively much less
difficult than defending one.37 This means that
mutual vulnerability is the condition that
exists in space today. Combined with the
knowledge of ready space competitors and
demonstrated countermeasures, the likely end
state is clear. Deterrence based on mutual
vulnerability, not dominance, is the future of
space.
An important step toward making deterrence
under mutual vulnerability politically and
militarily tolerable is to increase transparency.
Cooperation between space faring nations will
require agreed upon procedures that establish
the transparency necessary to solidify trust.38
Verification of the conditions of an agreement
serves to lower tensions in a de-escalating
cycle opposite that of the escalating cycle of
the security dilemma. As the dominant space
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power, increasing transparency will pose
difficulties for the United States. A
verification study conducted by the
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies points out that “[i]ncreasing the
openness of space operations…involves
inequity for the United States. Because we
can see more and see further, others stand to
gain more in the short run than we do. A
political judgment will be needed as to
whether the long term gain in stability and
predictability outweighs this short term,
relative disadvantage.”39 As discussed so far,
the Cold War example strongly suggests that
long term stability is preferable to short term
advantage. When the United States feared the
unknown nuclear capabilities of the former
Soviet Union during the Cold War, the
introduction of reconnaissance satellites
helped lower anxiety levels. Real information
was far more useful than the imagined worst
case scenarios in military planners’ minds.
Once arms control agreements where
negotiated and in place, transparency made
them bearable and helped them stick.
U.S. de facto dominance in space means that
the United States has the most to lose there.
In order to keep an arms race at bay, the
United States needs to improve its information
about what is happening in space in an
accurate and timely manner. Like
reconnaissance satellites during the Cold War,
better SSA can provide real information and
alleviate tension. SSA is the ability to assess
the big picture in space through detection,
characterization and tracking. It is who, what,
where, and why for all things in space. But
the capability to accomplish this in a timely
manner at the level of fidelity required for
accurate characterization of both capability

37

Robert Giffen (General, USAF retired, PhD) in discussion
with the author, March 2010.
38
Martel and Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,”
pp. 27-28.

39

Roger G. Harrison, Space and Verification, “Volume I:
Policy Implications,” (Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies, 2009), p. 13.

54

Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

	
  
and intent does not currently exist.40 As Dr.
David Finkleman points out, “the United
States Air Force Space Surveillance Network
(SSN) cannot gather data sufficient for
complete collision avoidance” of objects in
space.41 In light of the vital nature of space
assets to U.S. national security, this
knowledge gap serves to aggravate U.S. fears
and gives credence to calls for dominance
strategies. One step toward improving SSA
could be the incorporation of “Persistent
Technical Means for ground-based space
situational awareness.”42 This method would
employ the many civil and commercial means
of space surveillance already in place,
providing more timely and accurate SSA than
is possible utilizing just the Air Force Space
Surveillance Network (SSN). One unique
benefit of this approach, from a cooperative
legal framework perspective, is that “[n]o
single authority or stakeholder could prevent
the collective perception.”43 In other words, a
degree of transparency is implied in the
collaborative process itself, partially relieving
the problem of trusting no verification means
but your own. This approach has the added
benefit of including those with the least
technical means in cooperative arrangements
since they can attain the information required
for verification from outside resources.
However it evolves, an improved, reliable and
comprehensive SSA capability is a critical
step toward accepting the relative security of
deterrence within a legal framework of
verifiable mutual vulnerability.
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Deterrence or Dominance?
“WHAT MADE WAR INEVITABLE WAS THE GROWTH
OF ATHENIAN POWER AND THE FEAR WHICH THIS
CAUSED IN SPARTA.”44
The Cold War illustrates how nuclear
deterrence under mutual vulnerability
emerged after deterrence through dominance,
pursued by both sides, failed. Faced with a
determined adversary, there are only short
term advantages. The security dilemma
guarantees a response by the other side and
the action-reaction cycle ensures that neither
gains any lasting security. The Cold War
experience shows that, in spite of enormous
effort and expense, two competitors can
remain nearly as vulnerable in the end as
when they started. There was evidence early
in the Cold War that the long term reality
would not be dominance for either side, but
rather managed cooperation due to the de
facto condition of mutual vulnerability. The
same will likely be true of space. Space assets
are vulnerable today and will remain so in
spite of all the effort and money the United
States can muster. The difference now is that
the United States can work to implement that
long term reality before spending large
amounts of money trying to ward off the
inevitable vulnerability. There is an
opportunity to avoid a space arms race
entirely. In light of the current financial
troubles in the United States and elsewhere, it
is in the United States best interests that an
arms competition in space never occurs.
The latest National Space Policy published by
the Obama administration in June 2010 is a
small step in the right direction. It uses more
cooperative language than the previous space
policy and avoids the dominance rhetoric, but
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does not go far enough.45 The next iteration
should include specific steps required to move
toward long term cooperation with a workable
verification regime. Political leadership from
the highest levels is required both to guide
military efforts and to garner international
cooperation and commitment. The effort will
not be easy, but it’s much better to do it now
than to wait for a space arms race to put a
further drain on national coffers.
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